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Article: Prisoner dilemma: Generator strategic bidding in electricity markets

TitlePrisoner dilemma: Generator strategic bidding in electricity markets
Authors
KeywordsElectricity markets
Market efficiency
Prisoner dilemma
Stochastic optimal control
Issue Date2007
PublisherIEEE.
Citation
Ieee Transactions On Automatic Control, 2007, v. 52 n. 6, p. 1143-1149 How to Cite?
AbstractBecause of nonstorability of electric energy, temporal effects are important in electricity markets. Demand fluctuation and generator outages cause stochastic behaviors in the market. Therefore, viewing the generation competition as a dynamic and stochastic game, rather than the traditional static deterministic game commonly considered in economics seems more appropriate. This paper studies the generator bidding using stochastic optimal control formulations. A stochastic and dynamic feedback system is proposed to model generation competition and then a stochastic optimal control problem is formulated to investigate individual's optimization behavior. With the proposed approach, two interesting issues are addressed: 1) what is the effect of generators' strategic behaviors on individual's payoffs, and 2) how market efficiency evolves with generators' strategic behavior. The result shows that that generators' strategic behaviors have positive effects on market efficiency and demonstrates that the evolution of individual's payoffs w.r.t. generators' strategic behavior resembles a game of "Prisoner Dilemma." © 2007 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/73768
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.777
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.238
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Yen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWu, FFen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T06:54:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T06:54:34Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_HK
dc.identifier.citationIeee Transactions On Automatic Control, 2007, v. 52 n. 6, p. 1143-1149en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0018-9286en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/73768-
dc.description.abstractBecause of nonstorability of electric energy, temporal effects are important in electricity markets. Demand fluctuation and generator outages cause stochastic behaviors in the market. Therefore, viewing the generation competition as a dynamic and stochastic game, rather than the traditional static deterministic game commonly considered in economics seems more appropriate. This paper studies the generator bidding using stochastic optimal control formulations. A stochastic and dynamic feedback system is proposed to model generation competition and then a stochastic optimal control problem is formulated to investigate individual's optimization behavior. With the proposed approach, two interesting issues are addressed: 1) what is the effect of generators' strategic behaviors on individual's payoffs, and 2) how market efficiency evolves with generators' strategic behavior. The result shows that that generators' strategic behaviors have positive effects on market efficiency and demonstrates that the evolution of individual's payoffs w.r.t. generators' strategic behavior resembles a game of "Prisoner Dilemma." © 2007 IEEE.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherIEEE.en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Transactions on Automatic Controlen_HK
dc.rights©2007 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.en_HK
dc.subjectElectricity marketsen_HK
dc.subjectMarket efficiencyen_HK
dc.subjectPrisoner dilemmaen_HK
dc.subjectStochastic optimal controlen_HK
dc.titlePrisoner dilemma: Generator strategic bidding in electricity marketsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0018-9286&volume=52 No 6&spage=1143&epage=1149&date=2007&atitle=Prisoner+Dilemma:+Generator+Strategic+Bidding+in+Electricity+Marketsen_HK
dc.identifier.emailWu, FF: ffwu@eee.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityWu, FF=rp00194en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TAC.2007.899035en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-34447124405en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros132723en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-34447124405&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume52en_HK
dc.identifier.issue6en_HK
dc.identifier.spage1143en_HK
dc.identifier.epage1149en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000247353300025-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLiu, Y=22835324100en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWu, FF=7403465107en_HK

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