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Article: Impacts of transmission line limits on electricity market equilibrium

TitleImpacts of transmission line limits on electricity market equilibrium
Authors
KeywordsLinear supply function
Nash equilibrium
Optimal response curve
Power market
Strategic bidding
Issue Date2005
Citation
Dianli Xitong Zidonghua/Automation Of Electric Power Systems, 2005, v. 29 n. 15, p. 1-9 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper presents a systematic analysis about the impacts of transmission line limits (network constraints) on the market equilibrium. The bidding in power market is modeled as a two-level optimization problem, where in top level the ISO solves an optimal power flow (OPF) for maximizing the social welfare, and in the second level individual supplier (generator) seeks the maximum profits by the bidding of linear supply function to ISO. The existence of transmission line limit will divide suppliers' decision space into different regions, where within either region the constraint may be strictly binding or strictly relaxant. The fact that constraints have different status in different regions causes the different optimal strategy for generator. The possible market equilibrium is searched through the intersection of optimal response curves in different regions. At first, this paper investigates a simple three-node system, it is found that, after the inclusion of one transmission line limit, there may be a continuum of equilibrium, or there is no pure strategy equilibrium; if the equilibrium exists, there will be no nodal price difference or no congestion charge. Then the analytical conclusions are generalized to a complicated system. Numerical results support the analytical conclusions very well.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/73623
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.772
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLiu, YFen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWu, FFen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T06:53:10Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T06:53:10Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_HK
dc.identifier.citationDianli Xitong Zidonghua/Automation Of Electric Power Systems, 2005, v. 29 n. 15, p. 1-9en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1000-1026en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/73623-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a systematic analysis about the impacts of transmission line limits (network constraints) on the market equilibrium. The bidding in power market is modeled as a two-level optimization problem, where in top level the ISO solves an optimal power flow (OPF) for maximizing the social welfare, and in the second level individual supplier (generator) seeks the maximum profits by the bidding of linear supply function to ISO. The existence of transmission line limit will divide suppliers' decision space into different regions, where within either region the constraint may be strictly binding or strictly relaxant. The fact that constraints have different status in different regions causes the different optimal strategy for generator. The possible market equilibrium is searched through the intersection of optimal response curves in different regions. At first, this paper investigates a simple three-node system, it is found that, after the inclusion of one transmission line limit, there may be a continuum of equilibrium, or there is no pure strategy equilibrium; if the equilibrium exists, there will be no nodal price difference or no congestion charge. Then the analytical conclusions are generalized to a complicated system. Numerical results support the analytical conclusions very well.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofDianli Xitong Zidonghua/Automation of Electric Power Systemsen_HK
dc.subjectLinear supply functionen_HK
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_HK
dc.subjectOptimal response curveen_HK
dc.subjectPower marketen_HK
dc.subjectStrategic biddingen_HK
dc.titleImpacts of transmission line limits on electricity market equilibriumen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailWu, FF: ffwu@eee.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityWu, FF=rp00194en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-24044444572en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros119158en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-24044444572&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume29en_HK
dc.identifier.issue15en_HK
dc.identifier.spage1en_HK
dc.identifier.epage9en_HK
dc.publisher.placeChinaen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLiu, YF=22835324100en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWu, FF=7403465107en_HK

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