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Article: A game-theoretical model of private power production

TitleA game-theoretical model of private power production
Authors
KeywordsPrivate power production
Build–operate–transfer
Game theory
Two-level optimization
Issue Date2001
PublisherElsevier Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijepes
Citation
International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2001, v. 23 n. 3, p. 213-218 How to Cite?
AbstractPrivate power production has sprung up all over the world. The build–operate–transfer (BOT) arrangement has emerged as one of the most important options for private power production, especially in developing countries with rapidly growing demand and financial shortages. Based on oligopoly theory, the paper proposes a Stackelberg game model between a BOT investor and an electric utility whereby they can negotiate a long-term energy contract. Asymmetric pricing schemes are taken into account such that a host utility purchases electricity from a BOT company at its “avoided cost”, and sells its electricity to end users at its “average cost”. Our Stackelberg game model is transferred into a two-level optimization problem, and then solved by an iterative algorithm. The game model is demonstrated by an illustrative example.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/73606
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.587
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.741

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXing, W-
dc.contributor.authorWu, FF-
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T06:53:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T06:53:00Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2001, v. 23 n. 3, p. 213-218-
dc.identifier.issn0142-0615-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/73606-
dc.description.abstractPrivate power production has sprung up all over the world. The build–operate–transfer (BOT) arrangement has emerged as one of the most important options for private power production, especially in developing countries with rapidly growing demand and financial shortages. Based on oligopoly theory, the paper proposes a Stackelberg game model between a BOT investor and an electric utility whereby they can negotiate a long-term energy contract. Asymmetric pricing schemes are taken into account such that a host utility purchases electricity from a BOT company at its “avoided cost”, and sells its electricity to end users at its “average cost”. Our Stackelberg game model is transferred into a two-level optimization problem, and then solved by an iterative algorithm. The game model is demonstrated by an illustrative example.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherElsevier Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijepes-
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems-
dc.rightsNOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in [Journal title]. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in PUBLICATION, [VOL#, ISSUE#, (DATE)] DOI#-
dc.subjectPrivate power production-
dc.subjectBuild–operate–transfer-
dc.subjectGame theory-
dc.subjectTwo-level optimization-
dc.titleA game-theoretical model of private power production-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0142-0615&volume=23&spage=213&epage=218&date=2001&atitle=A+Game+Theoretical+Model+of+Private+Power+Productionen_HK
dc.identifier.emailWu, FF: ffwu@eee.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityWu, FF=rp00194-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0142-0615(00)00059-4-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0035283986-
dc.identifier.hkuros73181-
dc.identifier.volume23-
dc.identifier.issue3-
dc.identifier.spage213-
dc.identifier.epage218-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-

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