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Conference Paper: Help and Factionalism in Politics and Organizations
Title | Help and Factionalism in Politics and Organizations |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2008 |
Publisher | Center for Advanced Studies in Management and Economics of the University of Evora |
Citation | 2nd Annual Meeting of the Portuguese Economic Journal, Evora, Portugal, 4-5 July 2008 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Whether in electoral politics or promotions within organizations, players often face the dilemma of
whether to enter the contest or to assist other candidates. This paper analyzes incentives in a rank‐order
tournament when the winner, apart from earning the ‘first prize’, also has control over a ‘second prize’ that
he can distribute to his supporters. Some players may then be encouraged to help others in exchange for
paybacks, resulting in factionalism, with leaders, solo contestants and supporters of other candidates
sorted by ability. The number and the size of factions depend on the structure of the contest, which can be
manipulated to provide optimal incentives for effort coordination as required by political objectives or
production technology. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/63839 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chan, W | en_HK |
dc.contributor.author | Man, P | en_HK |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-13T04:33:21Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-13T04:33:21Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.citation | 2nd Annual Meeting of the Portuguese Economic Journal, Evora, Portugal, 4-5 July 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/63839 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Whether in electoral politics or promotions within organizations, players often face the dilemma of whether to enter the contest or to assist other candidates. This paper analyzes incentives in a rank‐order tournament when the winner, apart from earning the ‘first prize’, also has control over a ‘second prize’ that he can distribute to his supporters. Some players may then be encouraged to help others in exchange for paybacks, resulting in factionalism, with leaders, solo contestants and supporters of other candidates sorted by ability. The number and the size of factions depend on the structure of the contest, which can be manipulated to provide optimal incentives for effort coordination as required by political objectives or production technology. | - |
dc.language | eng | en_HK |
dc.publisher | Center for Advanced Studies in Management and Economics of the University of Evora | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Annual Meeting of the Portuguese Economic Journal | - |
dc.title | Help and Factionalism in Politics and Organizations | en_HK |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Chan, W: wchan@econ.hku.hk | en_HK |
dc.identifier.authority | Chan, W=rp01049 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 149796 | en_HK |