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Conference Paper: China as a regulatory state

TitleChina as a regulatory state
Authors
KeywordsRegulatory State
Disorder Costs
Dictatorship Costs
Transition Economy
China s Economic Reform
Rent Seeking
Issue Date2008
Citation
The 2nd Royal Economic Society's Young Economist of the Year Competition 2008 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper, by using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of government vis-à-vis market, which is the distinguishing feature of various models of a market economy including private orderings, private litigations through courts, and regulatory state (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Djankov et al., 2003). It is found that enterprises located in regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market enjoy better performance, suggesting that regulatory state is an appropriate model of a market economy for China. Evidence is also presented to rule out the concern that these results are driven by rent-seeking activities.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/63299

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDu, Jen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLu, Yen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTao, Zen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-13T04:20:35Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-13T04:20:35Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_HK
dc.identifier.citationThe 2nd Royal Economic Society's Young Economist of the Year Competition 2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/63299-
dc.description.abstractThis paper, by using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of government vis-à-vis market, which is the distinguishing feature of various models of a market economy including private orderings, private litigations through courts, and regulatory state (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Djankov et al., 2003). It is found that enterprises located in regions with greater powers of government vis-à-vis market enjoy better performance, suggesting that regulatory state is an appropriate model of a market economy for China. Evidence is also presented to rule out the concern that these results are driven by rent-seeking activities.-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofRES Young Economist of the Year 2008-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectRegulatory State-
dc.subjectDisorder Costs-
dc.subjectDictatorship Costs-
dc.subjectTransition Economy-
dc.subjectChina s Economic Reform-
dc.subjectRent Seeking-
dc.titleChina as a regulatory stateen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLu, Y: xzhongkanson@businessen_HK
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLu, Y=rp01081en_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTao, Z=rp01097en_HK
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.hkuros166140en_HK

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