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Conference Paper: Analysis of duopoly price competition between WLAN providers

TitleAnalysis of duopoly price competition between WLAN providers
Authors
KeywordsHotspot
Nash equilibrium
Price competition
Price of anarchy
Wardrop equilibrium
WLAN
Issue Date2009
PublisherIEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1000104
Citation
Ieee International Conference On Communications, 2009 How to Cite?
AbstractWith the rapid development of wireless Internet services, several WLAN service providers may coexist in one public hotspot to compete for the same group of customers, leading to an inevitable price competition. The charged price and the provisioned packet loss at each provider are major factors in determining users' demands and behaviors, which in turn will affect providers' revenue and social welfare. In this paper, we set up a novel game model to analyze a duopoly price competition. We first show the users' demands are distributed between providers according to a Wardrop Equilibrium and then prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium on providers' charged prices. Through analysis, we further find that in Nash equilibrium state the social welfare is very close to its maximal value in cooperative situation. Furthermore, the providers' aggregate revenues also do not decrease when the users have high sensitivity about the charged prices. Thus the competitive duopoly WLAN market can still run in an efficient way even in the absence of complex regulation schemes. ©2009 IEEE.
DescriptionProceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications, 2009, p. 1-5
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/62035
ISSN
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKong, Zen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTuffin, Ben_HK
dc.contributor.authorKwok, YKen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWang, Jen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-13T03:52:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-13T03:52:33Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_HK
dc.identifier.citationIeee International Conference On Communications, 2009en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0536-1486en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/62035-
dc.descriptionProceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications, 2009, p. 1-5en_HK
dc.description.abstractWith the rapid development of wireless Internet services, several WLAN service providers may coexist in one public hotspot to compete for the same group of customers, leading to an inevitable price competition. The charged price and the provisioned packet loss at each provider are major factors in determining users' demands and behaviors, which in turn will affect providers' revenue and social welfare. In this paper, we set up a novel game model to analyze a duopoly price competition. We first show the users' demands are distributed between providers according to a Wardrop Equilibrium and then prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium on providers' charged prices. Through analysis, we further find that in Nash equilibrium state the social welfare is very close to its maximal value in cooperative situation. Furthermore, the providers' aggregate revenues also do not decrease when the users have high sensitivity about the charged prices. Thus the competitive duopoly WLAN market can still run in an efficient way even in the absence of complex regulation schemes. ©2009 IEEE.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherIEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1000104-
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE International Conference on Communicationsen_HK
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rightsIEEE International Conference on Communications Proceedings. Copyright © IEEE.-
dc.rights©2009 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.-
dc.subjectHotspoten_HK
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_HK
dc.subjectPrice competitionen_HK
dc.subjectPrice of anarchyen_HK
dc.subjectWardrop equilibriumen_HK
dc.subjectWLANen_HK
dc.titleAnalysis of duopoly price competition between WLAN providersen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=1044-4556&volume=&spage=1&epage=5&date=2009&atitle=Analysis+of+duopoly+price+competition+between+WLAN+providers-
dc.identifier.emailKwok, YK:ykwok@eee.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityKwok, YK=rp00128en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/ICC.2009.5198744en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-70449474311en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros161720en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-70449474311&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage5-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridKong, Z=7006536683en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTuffin, B=6603445604en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridKwok, YK=7101857718en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWang, J=11439898400en_HK

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