File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: How a dominant retailer might design a purchase contract for a newsvendor-type product with price-sensitive demand

TitleHow a dominant retailer might design a purchase contract for a newsvendor-type product with price-sensitive demand
Authors
KeywordsGaming
Purchasing
Supply chain (contracts, coordination)
Issue Date2008
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor
Citation
European Journal Of Operational Research, 2008, v. 190 n. 2, p. 443-458 How to Cite?
AbstractA dominant retailer will purchase a newsvendor-type product from a manufacturer, who incurs a unit manufacturing cost k. The expected retail demand is a function of the unit retail price p. How should the retailer design her purchase contract? For this increasingly prevalent but inadequately studied scenario, we propose plausible adaptations of several contract formats that have been widely studied in the dominant-manufacturer context. For both symmetric-k and asymmetric-k-knowledge situations, we present performance results of these contracts. Our results then reveal that the performance of these contract formats under our scenario differs considerably from what one would surmise from the well-known results published for closely related scenarios. For example, the widely studied buyback and revenue-sharing formats turn out to be largely ineffective when implemented by a dominant retailer. In contrast, the two-part tariff format performs well relative to the theoretically optimal "menu of contracts." Our results highlight the need to study purchase contract formats designed specifically for dominant-retailer newsvendor-product channels. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/60225
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.679
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.595
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLau, AHLen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLau, HSen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWang, JCen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-31T04:06:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-31T04:06:14Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_HK
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Journal Of Operational Research, 2008, v. 190 n. 2, p. 443-458en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0377-2217en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/60225-
dc.description.abstractA dominant retailer will purchase a newsvendor-type product from a manufacturer, who incurs a unit manufacturing cost k. The expected retail demand is a function of the unit retail price p. How should the retailer design her purchase contract? For this increasingly prevalent but inadequately studied scenario, we propose plausible adaptations of several contract formats that have been widely studied in the dominant-manufacturer context. For both symmetric-k and asymmetric-k-knowledge situations, we present performance results of these contracts. Our results then reveal that the performance of these contract formats under our scenario differs considerably from what one would surmise from the well-known results published for closely related scenarios. For example, the widely studied buyback and revenue-sharing formats turn out to be largely ineffective when implemented by a dominant retailer. In contrast, the two-part tariff format performs well relative to the theoretically optimal "menu of contracts." Our results highlight the need to study purchase contract formats designed specifically for dominant-retailer newsvendor-product channels. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ejoren_HK
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Operational Researchen_HK
dc.rightsEuropean Journal of Operational Research. Copyright © Elsevier BV.en_HK
dc.subjectGamingen_HK
dc.subjectPurchasingen_HK
dc.subjectSupply chain (contracts, coordination)en_HK
dc.titleHow a dominant retailer might design a purchase contract for a newsvendor-type product with price-sensitive demanden_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0377-2217&volume=190&spage= 443&epage=458&date=2008&atitle=How+a+dominant+retailer+might+design+a+purchase+contract+for+a+newsvendor-type+product+with+price-sensitive+demanden_HK
dc.identifier.emailLau, AHL: ahlau@business.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.emailWang, JC: wangjc@business.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLau, AHL=rp01072en_HK
dc.identifier.authorityWang, JC=rp01107en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ejor.2007.06.042en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-41749085983en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros153237en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-41749085983&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume190en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage443en_HK
dc.identifier.epage458en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1872-6860-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000255819700010-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLau, AHL=7202626080en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLau, HS=7201497264en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWang, JC=15838282400en_HK

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats