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Article: Examining the conditional limits of relational governance: Specialized assets, performance ambiguity, and long-standing ties

TitleExamining the conditional limits of relational governance: Specialized assets, performance ambiguity, and long-standing ties
Authors
Issue Date2008
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd
Citation
Journal Of Management Studies, 2008, v. 45 n. 7, p. 1195-1216 How to Cite?
AbstractDespite recognition of the benefits of relational governance in inter-organizational exchanges, factors that may erode its value have received little examination. We extend the literature by asking whether self-interested opportunities and long-standing ties erode the positive association between relational governance and performance. Consistent with transaction cost and moral hazard logics, exchange hazards, particularly asset specificity and difficult performance measurement, dampen the positive association of relational governance and performance. We further find, consistent with recent inquiries into the dark side of embedded ties that the performance benefits associated with relational governance decline when parties rely on repeated partnerships. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2008.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/60192
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 4.26
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.931
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorPoppo, Len_HK
dc.contributor.authorZhou, KZen_HK
dc.contributor.authorZenger, TRen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-31T04:05:38Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-31T04:05:38Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Management Studies, 2008, v. 45 n. 7, p. 1195-1216en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0022-2380en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/60192-
dc.description.abstractDespite recognition of the benefits of relational governance in inter-organizational exchanges, factors that may erode its value have received little examination. We extend the literature by asking whether self-interested opportunities and long-standing ties erode the positive association between relational governance and performance. Consistent with transaction cost and moral hazard logics, exchange hazards, particularly asset specificity and difficult performance measurement, dampen the positive association of relational governance and performance. We further find, consistent with recent inquiries into the dark side of embedded ties that the performance benefits associated with relational governance decline when parties rely on repeated partnerships. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2008.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Management Studiesen_HK
dc.rightsJournal of Management Studies. Copyright © Blackwell Publishing Ltd.en_HK
dc.titleExamining the conditional limits of relational governance: Specialized assets, performance ambiguity, and long-standing tiesen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0022-2380&volume=45&issue=7&spage=1195&epage=1216&date=2008&atitle=Examining+the+Conditional+Limits+of+Relational+Governance:+Specialized+Assets,+Performance+Ambiguity,+and+Long-Standing+Tiesen_HK
dc.identifier.emailZhou, KZ: kevinz@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityZhou, KZ=rp01127en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-6486.2008.00779.xen_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-52649179458en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros156106en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-52649179458&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume45en_HK
dc.identifier.issue7en_HK
dc.identifier.spage1195en_HK
dc.identifier.epage1216en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000259361500002-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridPoppo, L=6508060826en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhou, KZ=7202914654en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZenger, TR=6602261882en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike3322679-

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