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Article: Endogenous preferential treatment in centralized admissions

TitleEndogenous preferential treatment in centralized admissions
Authors
Chiu, YSWeng, W
Issue Date2009
PublisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.rje.org/
Citation
Rand Journal Of Economics, 2009, v. 40 n. 2, p. 258-282 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00064.x
AbstractWe study a model of centralized admissions in which schools are allowed to pre-commit to admitting qualified applicants who rank them as their top choices over more qualified applicants who do not. A less popular school may use the pre-commitment to steal applicants who otherwise would not choose it as their top choice (the stealing motive); a popular school may use the pre-commitment to prevent its own applicants from being stolen (the preemptive motive). We identify the conditions for these two motives to exist. We also clarify the relationship of this phenomenon with that of pre-arrangement of school places. Copyright © 2009, RAND.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/60181
ISSN
0741-6261
2021 Impact Factor: 2.250
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.687
SSRN
1093207
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000265775300003
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChiu, YSen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWeng, Wen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-31T04:05:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-31T04:05:22Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_HK
dc.identifier.citationRand Journal Of Economics, 2009, v. 40 n. 2, p. 258-282en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0741-6261en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/60181-
dc.description.abstractWe study a model of centralized admissions in which schools are allowed to pre-commit to admitting qualified applicants who rank them as their top choices over more qualified applicants who do not. A less popular school may use the pre-commitment to steal applicants who otherwise would not choose it as their top choice (the stealing motive); a popular school may use the pre-commitment to prevent its own applicants from being stolen (the preemptive motive). We identify the conditions for these two motives to exist. We also clarify the relationship of this phenomenon with that of pre-arrangement of school places. Copyright © 2009, RAND.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.rje.org/en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofRAND Journal of Economicsen_HK
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.-
dc.titleEndogenous preferential treatment in centralized admissionsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0741-6261&volume=40&issue=2&spage=258&epage=282&date=2009&atitle=Endogenous+Preferential+Treatment+in+Centralized+Admissionsen_HK
dc.identifier.emailChiu, YS: sywchiu@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChiu, YS=rp01057en_HK
dc.description.naturepreprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00064.xen_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-70350154994en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros161865en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-70350154994&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume40en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage258en_HK
dc.identifier.epage282en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1756-2171-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000265775300003-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.ssrn1093207-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChiu, YS=7202775090en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWeng, W=36715569600en_HK
dc.identifier.issnl0741-6261-

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