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Article: Suspense: Dynamic incentives in sports contests

TitleSuspense: Dynamic incentives in sports contests
Authors
Issue Date2009
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/ECOJ
Citation
Economic Journal, 2009, v. 119 n. 534, p. 24-46 How to Cite?
AbstractIn a dynamic model of sports competition, if spectators care only about contestants'efforts, incentive schemes depending linearly on the final score difference dominate rank order schemes based only on who wins. If spectators also care about suspense, defined as valuing more contestants' efforts when the game is closer, rank order schemes can dominate linear score difference schemes, and this will be the case when the demand for suspense is sufficiently high. Under additional assumptions, we show that the optimal rank order scheme dominates a broad class of incentive schemes. © The Author(s). Journal compilation © 2009 by the Royal Economic Society.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/60176
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.37
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.390
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChan, Wen_HK
dc.contributor.authorCourty, Pen_HK
dc.contributor.authorHao, Len_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-31T04:05:17Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-31T04:05:17Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_HK
dc.identifier.citationEconomic Journal, 2009, v. 119 n. 534, p. 24-46en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0013-0133en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/60176-
dc.description.abstractIn a dynamic model of sports competition, if spectators care only about contestants'efforts, incentive schemes depending linearly on the final score difference dominate rank order schemes based only on who wins. If spectators also care about suspense, defined as valuing more contestants' efforts when the game is closer, rank order schemes can dominate linear score difference schemes, and this will be the case when the demand for suspense is sufficiently high. Under additional assumptions, we show that the optimal rank order scheme dominates a broad class of incentive schemes. © The Author(s). Journal compilation © 2009 by the Royal Economic Society.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/ECOJen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic Journalen_HK
dc.titleSuspense: Dynamic incentives in sports contestsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailChan, W: wchana@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChan, W=rp01049en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02204.xen_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-57749092654en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros163584en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-57749092654&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume119en_HK
dc.identifier.issue534en_HK
dc.identifier.spage24en_HK
dc.identifier.epage46en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1468-0297-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000261626300002-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChan, W=26631464400en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridCourty, P=7004020002en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHao, L=25925867900en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike3776165-

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