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Article: Corruption in bank lending to firms: Cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing

TitleCorruption in bank lending to firms: Cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing
Authors
KeywordsBank lending
Competition
Corruption
Information sharing
Issue Date2009
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfec
Citation
Journal Of Financial Economics, 2009, v. 91 n. 3, p. 361-388 How to Cite?
AbstractBuilding on the important study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine [2006. Bank supervision and corruption in lending. Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2131-2163], we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus/registries on corruption in bank lending. Using the unique World Bank data set (WBES) covering more than 4,000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus/registries, assembled by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [2007. Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299-329], and bank regulation data collected by Barth, Caprio, and Levine [2006. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern. Cambridge University Press, New York] to measure bank competition and information sharing, we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption, and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption. We also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks, legal environment, and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/60157
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.541
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 9.920
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBarth, JRen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLin, Cen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLin, Pen_HK
dc.contributor.authorSong, FMen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-31T04:04:57Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-31T04:04:57Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Financial Economics, 2009, v. 91 n. 3, p. 361-388en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0304-405Xen_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/60157-
dc.description.abstractBuilding on the important study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine [2006. Bank supervision and corruption in lending. Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2131-2163], we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus/registries on corruption in bank lending. Using the unique World Bank data set (WBES) covering more than 4,000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus/registries, assembled by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [2007. Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299-329], and bank regulation data collected by Barth, Caprio, and Levine [2006. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern. Cambridge University Press, New York] to measure bank competition and information sharing, we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption, and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption. We also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks, legal environment, and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfecen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Financial Economicsen_HK
dc.rightsJournal of Financial Economics. Copyright © Elsevier BV.en_HK
dc.subjectBank lendingen_HK
dc.subjectCompetitionen_HK
dc.subjectCorruptionen_HK
dc.subjectInformation sharingen_HK
dc.titleCorruption in bank lending to firms: Cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharingen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0304-405X&volume=91&issue=3&spage=361&epage=388&date=2009&atitle=Corruption+in+bank+lending+to+firms:+Cross-country+micro+evidence+on+the+beneficial+role+of+competition+and+information+sharingen_HK
dc.identifier.emailSong, FM: fmsong@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authoritySong, FM=rp01095en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.04.003en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-61549136700en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros148326en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros163187-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-61549136700&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume91en_HK
dc.identifier.issue3en_HK
dc.identifier.spage361en_HK
dc.identifier.epage388en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000264415500007-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridBarth, JR=35791509900en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLin, C=25630694300en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLin, P=7403225546en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSong, FM=7203075605en_HK

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