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Article: Supervising for quality: An empirical examination of institutional arrangements in China's construction industry

TitleSupervising for quality: An empirical examination of institutional arrangements in China's construction industry
Authors
KeywordsCoase Theorem
Construction quality
Construction supervision
Principal-agent theory
State-owned enterprise
Issue Date2008
PublisherRoutledge. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/01446193.asp
Citation
Construction Management And Economics, 2008, v. 26 n. 7, p. 723-737 How to Cite?
AbstractMost of the literature on the rapid changes in institutional arrangements in China's construction industry have either limited themselves to a description of these changes or relied on opinion surveys to draw conclusions. Few researchers have conducted serious empirical examinations, especially regarding the ownership of developers or contractors. To fill this gap, we empirically examined the effectiveness of compulsory construction supervision arrangements on the quality of construction projects in mainland China, explained the seemingly inexplicable phenomenon that projects undertaken by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are of better quality than those undertaken by non-SOEs, explored the law of tort in relation to construction supervision firms, tested the published official data from 1991 to 2001 on construction 'good quality rates' with regression against per capita values and powers of machinery as well as the capital-output ratios of both SOEs and non-SOEs, identified the determining factors affecting construction quality, and demonstrated the limitations of using the principal-agent theory in analysing the construction industry. The results supported the corollary of the Coase Theorem that resource allocation in terms of output quality will be affected by changes in the institutional arrangements.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/59758
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.967
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorYung, Pen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLai, LWCen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-31T03:56:51Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-31T03:56:51Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_HK
dc.identifier.citationConstruction Management And Economics, 2008, v. 26 n. 7, p. 723-737en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0144-6193en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/59758-
dc.description.abstractMost of the literature on the rapid changes in institutional arrangements in China's construction industry have either limited themselves to a description of these changes or relied on opinion surveys to draw conclusions. Few researchers have conducted serious empirical examinations, especially regarding the ownership of developers or contractors. To fill this gap, we empirically examined the effectiveness of compulsory construction supervision arrangements on the quality of construction projects in mainland China, explained the seemingly inexplicable phenomenon that projects undertaken by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are of better quality than those undertaken by non-SOEs, explored the law of tort in relation to construction supervision firms, tested the published official data from 1991 to 2001 on construction 'good quality rates' with regression against per capita values and powers of machinery as well as the capital-output ratios of both SOEs and non-SOEs, identified the determining factors affecting construction quality, and demonstrated the limitations of using the principal-agent theory in analysing the construction industry. The results supported the corollary of the Coase Theorem that resource allocation in terms of output quality will be affected by changes in the institutional arrangements.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherRoutledge. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/01446193.aspen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofConstruction Management and Economicsen_HK
dc.subjectCoase Theoremen_HK
dc.subjectConstruction qualityen_HK
dc.subjectConstruction supervisionen_HK
dc.subjectPrincipal-agent theoryen_HK
dc.subjectState-owned enterpriseen_HK
dc.titleSupervising for quality: An empirical examination of institutional arrangements in China's construction industryen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0144-6193&volume=26&issue=7&spage=727&epage=737&date=2008&atitle=Supervising+for+quality:+an+empirical+examination+of+institutional+arrangements+in+China’s+construction+industryen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLai, LWC:wclai@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLai, LWC=rp01004en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/01446190801998690en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-47349116069en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros147646en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-47349116069&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume26en_HK
dc.identifier.issue7en_HK
dc.identifier.spage723en_HK
dc.identifier.epage737en_HK
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridYung, P=24377307900en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLai, LWC=7202616218en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike3113331-

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