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Article: Price interactions between theme park and tour operator

TitlePrice interactions between theme park and tour operator
Authors
KeywordsBargaining game
Coordination
Hong Kong Disneyland
Stackelberg game
Tour operators
Issue Date2009
PublisherI P Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.ippublishing.com/te.htm
Citation
Tourism Economics, 2009, v. 15 n. 4, p. 813-824 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper conducts a theoretical investigation into pricing competition and coordination between Hong Kong Disneyland (HKD) and a tour operator. HKD supplies two types of admission ticket to the tour operator: an admission-only ticket and a package ticket that combines admission to the park and one night's accommodation in its hotels. The tour operator then sells these two types of admission ticket in the target market. A Stackelberg game model is proposed to formulate the leader-follower relationship, with HKD leading and the tour operator following. The equilibrium prices are derived by backward induction. The theoretical results show that HKD can coordinate with the tour operator through a quantity discount schedule. A Nash bargaining game suggests that HKD receives a larger share of the profit growth due to its dominant market power.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/58878
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.392
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.674
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSong, Hen_HK
dc.contributor.authorYang, Sen_HK
dc.contributor.authorHuang, GQen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-31T03:38:38Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-31T03:38:38Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_HK
dc.identifier.citationTourism Economics, 2009, v. 15 n. 4, p. 813-824en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1354-8166en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/58878-
dc.description.abstractThis paper conducts a theoretical investigation into pricing competition and coordination between Hong Kong Disneyland (HKD) and a tour operator. HKD supplies two types of admission ticket to the tour operator: an admission-only ticket and a package ticket that combines admission to the park and one night's accommodation in its hotels. The tour operator then sells these two types of admission ticket in the target market. A Stackelberg game model is proposed to formulate the leader-follower relationship, with HKD leading and the tour operator following. The equilibrium prices are derived by backward induction. The theoretical results show that HKD can coordinate with the tour operator through a quantity discount schedule. A Nash bargaining game suggests that HKD receives a larger share of the profit growth due to its dominant market power.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherI P Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.ippublishing.com/te.htmen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofTourism Economicsen_HK
dc.subjectBargaining gameen_HK
dc.subjectCoordinationen_HK
dc.subjectHong Kong Disneylanden_HK
dc.subjectStackelberg gameen_HK
dc.subjectTour operatorsen_HK
dc.titlePrice interactions between theme park and tour operatoren_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailHuang, GQ:gqhuang@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityHuang, GQ=rp00118en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-73949083146en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros149751en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-73949083146&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume15en_HK
dc.identifier.issue4en_HK
dc.identifier.spage813en_HK
dc.identifier.epage824en_HK
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSong, H=7404036753en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridYang, S=35207523100en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHuang, GQ=7403425048en_HK

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