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Article: Marital transfer and intra-household allocation: A Nash-bargaining analysis

TitleMarital transfer and intra-household allocation: A Nash-bargaining analysis
Authors
KeywordsDowry
Inter-generational transfers
Intra-household allocation
Issue Date2003
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Citation
Journal Of Economic Behavior And Organization, 2003, v. 52 n. 1, p. 133-146 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper explores the implications of inter-generational marital transfers on the allocation of resources within a conjugal household. Adopting a Nash-bargaining framework with alternative models of the threat points, it is argued that parents have greater incentive to make transfers to a married child than to a single child because of the efficiency gains from joint consumption and production of family public goods and because of the increase in bargaining power of the child in the allocation of private consumption. Such transfers also enhance marital stability by increasing the efficiency gains from marriage. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/48716
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.374
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.425
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSuen, Wen_HK
dc.contributor.authorChan, Wen_HK
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Jen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-22T04:22:13Z-
dc.date.available2008-05-22T04:22:13Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Economic Behavior And Organization, 2003, v. 52 n. 1, p. 133-146en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/48716-
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the implications of inter-generational marital transfers on the allocation of resources within a conjugal household. Adopting a Nash-bargaining framework with alternative models of the threat points, it is argued that parents have greater incentive to make transfers to a married child than to a single child because of the efficiency gains from joint consumption and production of family public goods and because of the increase in bargaining power of the child in the allocation of private consumption. Such transfers also enhance marital stability by increasing the efficiency gains from marriage. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en_HK
dc.format.extent100323 bytes-
dc.format.extent242007 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jeboen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Behavior and Organizationen_HK
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rightsJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Copyright © Elsevier BV.en_HK
dc.subjectDowryen_HK
dc.subjectInter-generational transfersen_HK
dc.subjectIntra-household allocationen_HK
dc.titleMarital transfer and intra-household allocation: A Nash-bargaining analysisen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0167-2681&volume=52&issue=1&spage=133&epage=146&date=2003&atitle=Marital+transfer+and+intra-household+allocation:+a+Nash-bargaining+analysisen_HK
dc.identifier.emailSuen, W: hrneswc@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.emailChan, W: wchana@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authoritySuen, W=rp00066en_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChan, W=rp01049en_HK
dc.description.naturepostprinten_HK
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00165-8en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0037634109en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros91185-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0037634109&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume52en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage133en_HK
dc.identifier.epage146en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000185301700007-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSuen, W=7006977946en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChan, W=26631464400en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhang, J=7601360094en_HK

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