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Conference Paper: A game-theoretic model of private power production

TitleA game-theoretic model of private power production
Authors
KeywordsBuild-operate-transfer
Game theory
Private power production
Two-level optimization
Issue Date2000
PublisherIEEE.
Citation
IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, Seattle, WA, 16-20 July 2000, v. 4, p. 2211-2216 How to Cite?
AbstractPrivate power production has sprung up all around the world, especially in developing countries with rapidly increasing demands and shortage of finance. BOT arrangements have emerged as one of the most important options of private power production. Based on oligopoly theory, this paper proposes a Stackelberg game model between a BOT company and a utility where they negotiate a long-term energy contract. It is assumed that a host utility purchases electricity from a BOT company at its "avoided cost", and sells its electricity to end users at its average cost. Taking asymmetric pricing into account, our Stackelberg game model is transferred into a two-level optimization problem, and is then solved by an iterative algorithm.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/46340
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXing, Wen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWu, FFen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-30T06:47:43Z-
dc.date.available2007-10-30T06:47:43Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_HK
dc.identifier.citationIEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, Seattle, WA, 16-20 July 2000, v. 4, p. 2211-2216en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/46340-
dc.description.abstractPrivate power production has sprung up all around the world, especially in developing countries with rapidly increasing demands and shortage of finance. BOT arrangements have emerged as one of the most important options of private power production. Based on oligopoly theory, this paper proposes a Stackelberg game model between a BOT company and a utility where they negotiate a long-term energy contract. It is assumed that a host utility purchases electricity from a BOT company at its "avoided cost", and sells its electricity to end users at its average cost. Taking asymmetric pricing into account, our Stackelberg game model is transferred into a two-level optimization problem, and is then solved by an iterative algorithm.en_HK
dc.format.extent540010 bytes-
dc.format.extent12538 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherIEEE.en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conferenceen_HK
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rights©2000 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.en_HK
dc.subjectBuild-operate-transferen_HK
dc.subjectGame theoryen_HK
dc.subjectPrivate power productionen_HK
dc.subjectTwo-level optimizationen_HK
dc.titleA game-theoretic model of private power productionen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailWu, FF: ffwu@eee.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityWu, FF=rp00194en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_HK
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/PESS.2000.867335en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0038153905en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros73305-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0038153905&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume4en_HK
dc.identifier.spage2211en_HK
dc.identifier.epage2216en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridXing, W=7102933005en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWu, FF=7403465107en_HK

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