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Conference Paper: Research on allocation of gross electromagnetic pollution emission right in power quality markets

TitleResearch on allocation of gross electromagnetic pollution emission right in power quality markets
Authors
KeywordsElectricity market
Game theory
Power quality
Power quality market
Issue Date2005
PublisherIEEE.
Citation
IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, San Francisco, California, USA, 12-16 June 2005, v. 1, p. 320-325 How to Cite?
AbstractManagement of Power Quality (PQ) suffers more pressure from economy and social equity, it is necessary to control electromagnetic pollution emitted from both electric utilities and customers. Calculation of optimal Emission Right (ER) gross and its distribution is an important content of controlling electromagnetic pollution, and it should be worked out based on cooperative game. This paper analyses game actions among all members in one Point of Common Connection (PCC) for pursuing ER and high PQ, and clarifies the highest price of ER and PQ service that is acceptable for gamers. This paper adopts uniform price sealed auction model to make gamers take the acceptable highest price of ER and PQ service as their bidding price, and PQ Supervision Department (PQSD) can make full use of their information from auction, then the calculated ER gross can satisfy Pareto optimality. That gross can maximize social integrative benefits. This auction model also proposes the Bayes Nash equilibrium for the optimal distribution of ER among all gamers. This equilibrium can optimize distribution of social and electromagnetic resource. Examples indicate that the proposed model for optimal gross and distribution of ER based on game theory is feasible and effective. © 2005 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/45798
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorJin, Gen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLi, Gen_HK
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Men_HK
dc.contributor.authorNi, Yen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-30T06:35:41Z-
dc.date.available2007-10-30T06:35:41Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_HK
dc.identifier.citationIEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, San Francisco, California, USA, 12-16 June 2005, v. 1, p. 320-325en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/45798-
dc.description.abstractManagement of Power Quality (PQ) suffers more pressure from economy and social equity, it is necessary to control electromagnetic pollution emitted from both electric utilities and customers. Calculation of optimal Emission Right (ER) gross and its distribution is an important content of controlling electromagnetic pollution, and it should be worked out based on cooperative game. This paper analyses game actions among all members in one Point of Common Connection (PCC) for pursuing ER and high PQ, and clarifies the highest price of ER and PQ service that is acceptable for gamers. This paper adopts uniform price sealed auction model to make gamers take the acceptable highest price of ER and PQ service as their bidding price, and PQ Supervision Department (PQSD) can make full use of their information from auction, then the calculated ER gross can satisfy Pareto optimality. That gross can maximize social integrative benefits. This auction model also proposes the Bayes Nash equilibrium for the optimal distribution of ER among all gamers. This equilibrium can optimize distribution of social and electromagnetic resource. Examples indicate that the proposed model for optimal gross and distribution of ER based on game theory is feasible and effective. © 2005 IEEE.en_HK
dc.format.extent589420 bytes-
dc.format.extent11910 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherIEEE.en_HK
dc.relation.ispartof2005 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meetingen_HK
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rights©2005 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.en_HK
dc.subjectElectricity marketen_HK
dc.subjectGame theoryen_HK
dc.subjectPower qualityen_HK
dc.subjectPower quality marketen_HK
dc.titleResearch on allocation of gross electromagnetic pollution emission right in power quality marketsen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailNi, Y: yxni@eee.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityNi, Y=rp00161en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_HK
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/PES.2005.1489325en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-27144493855en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros104255-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-27144493855&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage320en_HK
dc.identifier.epage325en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridJin, G=36867994700en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, G=8400663800en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhou, M=35390426600en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridNi, Y=7402910021en_HK

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