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- Publisher Website: 10.1109/PES.2005.1489325
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-27144493855
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Conference Paper: Research on allocation of gross electromagnetic pollution emission right in power quality markets
Title | Research on allocation of gross electromagnetic pollution emission right in power quality markets |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Electricity market Game theory Power quality Power quality market |
Issue Date | 2005 |
Publisher | IEEE. |
Citation | IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, San Francisco, California, USA, 12-16 June 2005, v. 1, p. 320-325 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Management of Power Quality (PQ) suffers more pressure from economy and social equity, it is necessary to control electromagnetic pollution emitted from both electric utilities and customers. Calculation of optimal Emission Right (ER) gross and its distribution is an important content of controlling electromagnetic pollution, and it should be worked out based on cooperative game. This paper analyses game actions among all members in one Point of Common Connection (PCC) for pursuing ER and high PQ, and clarifies the highest price of ER and PQ service that is acceptable for gamers. This paper adopts uniform price sealed auction model to make gamers take the acceptable highest price of ER and PQ service as their bidding price, and PQ Supervision Department (PQSD) can make full use of their information from auction, then the calculated ER gross can satisfy Pareto optimality. That gross can maximize social integrative benefits. This auction model also proposes the Bayes Nash equilibrium for the optimal distribution of ER among all gamers. This equilibrium can optimize distribution of social and electromagnetic resource. Examples indicate that the proposed model for optimal gross and distribution of ER based on game theory is feasible and effective. © 2005 IEEE. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/45798 |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Jin, G | en_HK |
dc.contributor.author | Li, G | en_HK |
dc.contributor.author | Zhou, M | en_HK |
dc.contributor.author | Ni, Y | en_HK |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-10-30T06:35:41Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2007-10-30T06:35:41Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.citation | IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, San Francisco, California, USA, 12-16 June 2005, v. 1, p. 320-325 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/45798 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Management of Power Quality (PQ) suffers more pressure from economy and social equity, it is necessary to control electromagnetic pollution emitted from both electric utilities and customers. Calculation of optimal Emission Right (ER) gross and its distribution is an important content of controlling electromagnetic pollution, and it should be worked out based on cooperative game. This paper analyses game actions among all members in one Point of Common Connection (PCC) for pursuing ER and high PQ, and clarifies the highest price of ER and PQ service that is acceptable for gamers. This paper adopts uniform price sealed auction model to make gamers take the acceptable highest price of ER and PQ service as their bidding price, and PQ Supervision Department (PQSD) can make full use of their information from auction, then the calculated ER gross can satisfy Pareto optimality. That gross can maximize social integrative benefits. This auction model also proposes the Bayes Nash equilibrium for the optimal distribution of ER among all gamers. This equilibrium can optimize distribution of social and electromagnetic resource. Examples indicate that the proposed model for optimal gross and distribution of ER based on game theory is feasible and effective. © 2005 IEEE. | en_HK |
dc.format.extent | 589420 bytes | - |
dc.format.extent | 11910 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.mimetype | text/plain | - |
dc.language | eng | en_HK |
dc.publisher | IEEE. | en_HK |
dc.relation.ispartof | 2005 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting | en_HK |
dc.rights | ©2005 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE. | - |
dc.subject | Electricity market | en_HK |
dc.subject | Game theory | en_HK |
dc.subject | Power quality | en_HK |
dc.subject | Power quality market | en_HK |
dc.title | Research on allocation of gross electromagnetic pollution emission right in power quality markets | en_HK |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_HK |
dc.identifier.email | Ni, Y: yxni@eee.hku.hk | en_HK |
dc.identifier.authority | Ni, Y=rp00161 | en_HK |
dc.description.nature | published_or_final_version | en_HK |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/PES.2005.1489325 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-27144493855 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 104255 | - |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-27144493855&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_HK |
dc.identifier.volume | 1 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.spage | 320 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.epage | 325 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Jin, G=36867994700 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Li, G=8400663800 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Zhou, M=35390426600 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Ni, Y=7402910021 | en_HK |