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Conference Paper: Existence & uniqueness of consistent conjectural variation equilibrium in electricity markets

TitleExistence & uniqueness of consistent conjectural variation equilibrium in electricity markets
Authors
KeywordsConsistent conjecture variation
Electricity markets
Existence & uniqueness
Oligopoly
Issue Date2005
PublisherIEEE.
Citation
IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, San Francisco, California, USA, 12-16 June 2005, v. 1, p. 314-319 How to Cite?
AbstractThe real electricity markets are usually oligopoly, where market suppliers (generators) will have some market power and can adopt strategic bidding strategies for maximum profits. Generally, the game-theory based methods are the natural way to analyze the market equilibrium and study the strategic behaviors. As a widely studied method in game theory, the conjecture variation technique is reported to model the strategic behavior in deregulated electricity markets recently. Unfortunately, the conjecture variation models have been criticized for the drawback of logical inconsistence and abundant equilibria. Aim for this, the existence and uniqueness of consistent conjectural variation equilibrium in the electricity markets are investigated. Due to some good characteristics of electricity markets and using an infinite horizon optimization model, it is shown that the consistent conjecture variation will satisfy a coupled nonlinear equation system and there is only one equilibrium. © 2005 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/45796
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Yen_HK
dc.contributor.authorNi, YXen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-30T06:35:39Z-
dc.date.available2007-10-30T06:35:39Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_HK
dc.identifier.citationIEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, San Francisco, California, USA, 12-16 June 2005, v. 1, p. 314-319en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/45796-
dc.description.abstractThe real electricity markets are usually oligopoly, where market suppliers (generators) will have some market power and can adopt strategic bidding strategies for maximum profits. Generally, the game-theory based methods are the natural way to analyze the market equilibrium and study the strategic behaviors. As a widely studied method in game theory, the conjecture variation technique is reported to model the strategic behavior in deregulated electricity markets recently. Unfortunately, the conjecture variation models have been criticized for the drawback of logical inconsistence and abundant equilibria. Aim for this, the existence and uniqueness of consistent conjectural variation equilibrium in the electricity markets are investigated. Due to some good characteristics of electricity markets and using an infinite horizon optimization model, it is shown that the consistent conjecture variation will satisfy a coupled nonlinear equation system and there is only one equilibrium. © 2005 IEEE.en_HK
dc.format.extent616124 bytes-
dc.format.extent11910 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherIEEE.en_HK
dc.relation.ispartof2005 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meetingen_HK
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rights©2005 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.en_HK
dc.subjectConsistent conjecture variationen_HK
dc.subjectElectricity marketsen_HK
dc.subjectExistence & uniquenessen_HK
dc.subjectOligopolyen_HK
dc.titleExistence & uniqueness of consistent conjectural variation equilibrium in electricity marketsen_HK
dc.typeConference_Paperen_HK
dc.identifier.emailNi, YX: yxni@eee.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityNi, YX=rp00161en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_HK
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/PES.2005.1489314en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-27144560499en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros104251-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-27144560499&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage314en_HK
dc.identifier.epage319en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLiu, Y=22835324100en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridNi, YX=7402910021en_HK

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