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Article: External recruitment versus internal promotion

TitleExternal recruitment versus internal promotion
Authors
KeywordsBusiness and economics
Labor and industrial relations
Issue Date1996
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE
Citation
Journal Of Labor Economics, 1996, v. 14 n. 4, p. 555-570 How to Cite?
AbstractThis article analyzes the choice between internal promotion and external recruitment within the framework of an economic contest. Opening up the competition for a position to external candidates reduces the chance of promotion for existing workers and therefore their incentive to work. Increasing the prize for winning can maintain incentives but is limited by moral hazard and potentially disruptive office politics. Alternatively, a competitive handicap can be awarded to existing workers to boost their chances. This strategy is consistent with the general observation that an external candidate is recruited only if she is significantly superior to the internal contestants.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/43534
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.214
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 5.631
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChan, Wen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2007-03-23T04:48:13Z-
dc.date.available2007-03-23T04:48:13Z-
dc.date.issued1996en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Labor Economics, 1996, v. 14 n. 4, p. 555-570en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0734-306Xen_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/43534-
dc.description.abstractThis article analyzes the choice between internal promotion and external recruitment within the framework of an economic contest. Opening up the competition for a position to external candidates reduces the chance of promotion for existing workers and therefore their incentive to work. Increasing the prize for winning can maintain incentives but is limited by moral hazard and potentially disruptive office politics. Alternatively, a competitive handicap can be awarded to existing workers to boost their chances. This strategy is consistent with the general observation that an external candidate is recruited only if she is significantly superior to the internal contestants.en_HK
dc.format.extent1414073 bytes-
dc.format.extent26112 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/msword-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLEen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Labor Economicsen_HK
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rightsJournal of Labor Economics. Copyright © University of Chicago Press.en_HK
dc.subjectBusiness and economicsen_HK
dc.subjectLabor and industrial relationsen_HK
dc.titleExternal recruitment versus internal promotionen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0734-306X&volume=14&issue=4&spage=555&epage=570&date=1996&atitle=External+Recruitment+Versus+Internal+Promotionen_HK
dc.identifier.emailChan, W: wchana@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChan, W=rp01049en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_HK
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/209822en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0030517990en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros27161-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0030517990&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume14en_HK
dc.identifier.issue4en_HK
dc.identifier.spage555en_HK
dc.identifier.epage570en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:A1996VQ23800001-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChan, W=26631464400en_HK

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