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Article: Risk sharing, sorting, and early contracting

TitleRisk sharing, sorting, and early contracting
Authors
KeywordsRisk sharing
Economic models
Equilibrium
Production functions
Labor market
Issue Date2000
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/
Citation
Journal Of Political Economy, 2000, v. 108 n. 5, p. 1058-1091 How to Cite?
AbstractIn an assignment market with uncertainty regarding productive ability of participants, early contracting can occur as participants balance risk sharing and sorting efficiency. More promising agents may contract early with each other because insurance gains outweigh sorting inefficiency, whereas less promising agents wait. It can also happen in equilibrium that more promising job applicants contract early with less promising firms. Such worker-driven equilibria may arise when applicants are more risk-averse, have greater uncertainty regarding their quality, or face a tighter market and when production exhibits increasing returns to firms' qualities. Early contracting then unambiguously hurts the more promising firms that choose to wait.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/42278
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.75
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 7.646
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLi, Hen_HK
dc.contributor.authorSuen, Wen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2007-01-08T02:33:24Z-
dc.date.available2007-01-08T02:33:24Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Political Economy, 2000, v. 108 n. 5, p. 1058-1091en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/42278-
dc.description.abstractIn an assignment market with uncertainty regarding productive ability of participants, early contracting can occur as participants balance risk sharing and sorting efficiency. More promising agents may contract early with each other because insurance gains outweigh sorting inefficiency, whereas less promising agents wait. It can also happen in equilibrium that more promising job applicants contract early with less promising firms. Such worker-driven equilibria may arise when applicants are more risk-averse, have greater uncertainty regarding their quality, or face a tighter market and when production exhibits increasing returns to firms' qualities. Early contracting then unambiguously hurts the more promising firms that choose to wait.en_HK
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dc.format.extent25600 bytes-
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dc.format.mimetypeapplication/msword-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Political Economyen_HK
dc.rightsJournal of Political Economy. Copyright © University of Chicago Press.en_HK
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectRisk sharingen_HK
dc.subjectEconomic modelsen_HK
dc.subjectEquilibriumen_HK
dc.subjectProduction functionsen_HK
dc.subjectLabor marketen_HK
dc.titleRisk sharing, sorting, and early contractingen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0022-3808&volume=108&issue=5&spage=1058&epage=1091&date=2000&atitle=Risk+Sharing,+Sorting,+and+Early+Contractingen_HK
dc.identifier.emailSuen, W: hrneswc@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authoritySuen, W=rp00066en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_HK
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/317675en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0033652586en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros57763-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0033652586&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume108en_HK
dc.identifier.issue5en_HK
dc.identifier.spage1058en_HK
dc.identifier.epage1091en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000089910600010-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, H=25960883900en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSuen, W=7006977946en_HK

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