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- Publisher Website: 10.1017/S0022109024000164
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85186933501
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Article: Judge Ideology and Opportunistic Insider Trading
| Title | Judge Ideology and Opportunistic Insider Trading |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Issue Date | 29-Feb-2024 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Citation | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2024 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | Although federal judges are the ultimate arbiters of insider trading enforcement, the role of their political ideology in insider trading is unclear. Using the partisanship of judges’ nominating presidents to measure judge ideology, we first document that liberal judges are associated with heavier penalties in insider trading lawsuits than conservative judges. Next, we find that firms located in circuits with more liberal judges have fewer opportunistic insider sales. Cross-sectional analyses show that this deterrent effect is stronger when managers face a higher risk of insider trading lawsuits. Finally, we find that the SEC considers judges’ ideology when selecting litigation forums. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/341681 |
| ISSN | 2021 Impact Factor: 4.337 2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.657 |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Huang, Allen H | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Hui, Kai Wai | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Zheng, Yue | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-20T06:58:15Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-03-20T06:58:15Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2024-02-29 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2024 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0022-1090 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/341681 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | <p>Although federal judges are the ultimate arbiters of insider trading enforcement, the role of their political ideology in insider trading is unclear. Using the partisanship of judges’ nominating presidents to measure judge ideology, we first document that liberal judges are associated with heavier penalties in insider trading lawsuits than conservative judges. Next, we find that firms located in circuits with more liberal judges have fewer opportunistic insider sales. Cross-sectional analyses show that this deterrent effect is stronger when managers face a higher risk of insider trading lawsuits. Finally, we find that the SEC considers judges’ ideology when selecting litigation forums.<br></p> | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis | - |
| dc.title | Judge Ideology and Opportunistic Insider Trading | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0022109024000164 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85186933501 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1756-6916 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-1090 | - |