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- Publisher Website: 10.1080/09638180.2018.1446036
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85042934682
- WOS: WOS:000458758100005
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Article: Not Clawing the Hand that Feeds You: The Case of Co-opted Boards and Clawbacks
Title | Not Clawing the Hand that Feeds You: The Case of Co-opted Boards and Clawbacks |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Citation | European Accounting Review, 2019, v. 28, n. 1, p. 101-127 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We examine how board co-option, defined as the fraction of the board comprising directors appointed after the CEO assumed office, is related to clawback adoption. We find that co-opted boards have a lower probability of adopting clawback provisions. Further, the negative association between board co-option and clawback adoption is more pronounced when at least one co-opted member is on the compensation committee and when there is a higher likelihood that a clawback provision will be triggered. Finally, we find that board co-option is an important mechanism through which longer tenured CEOs reduce the likelihood of clawback adoption. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/315285 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.264 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Huang, Sterling | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lim, Chee Yeow | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ng, Jeffrey | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-08-05T10:18:20Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-08-05T10:18:20Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | European Accounting Review, 2019, v. 28, n. 1, p. 101-127 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0963-8180 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/315285 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine how board co-option, defined as the fraction of the board comprising directors appointed after the CEO assumed office, is related to clawback adoption. We find that co-opted boards have a lower probability of adopting clawback provisions. Further, the negative association between board co-option and clawback adoption is more pronounced when at least one co-opted member is on the compensation committee and when there is a higher likelihood that a clawback provision will be triggered. Finally, we find that board co-option is an important mechanism through which longer tenured CEOs reduce the likelihood of clawback adoption. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | European Accounting Review | - |
dc.title | Not Clawing the Hand that Feeds You: The Case of Co-opted Boards and Clawbacks | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/09638180.2018.1446036 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85042934682 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 28 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 101 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 127 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1468-4497 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000458758100005 | - |