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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/1475-679X.12368
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85107440267
- WOS: WOS:000659703800001
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Article: Talk Less, Learn More: Strategic Disclosure in Response to Managerial Learning from the Options Market
Title | Talk Less, Learn More: Strategic Disclosure in Response to Managerial Learning from the Options Market |
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Authors | |
Keywords | information feedback management earnings forecasts managerial learning options trading voluntary disclosure |
Issue Date | 2021 |
Citation | Journal of Accounting Research, 2021, v. 59, n. 5, p. 1609-1649 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We examine how options trading affects voluntary corporate disclosure, so that we can shed light on whether managers’ potential learning from the options market induces them to withhold disclosure. We find that options trading reduces the likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts, suggesting that firms that have active options trading on their stock make fewer voluntary disclosures. This finding is in accordance with the theoretical prediction that managers strategically reduce disclosure to avoid crowding out informed trading, which can give them informative feedback for their decision making. In support of the managerial learning channel, we document a real effect of reduced disclosure: When managers disclose less, options trading has a stronger positive effect on firm investment efficiency. The more pronounced effect of options trading on management earnings forecasts when the need for managerial learning is higher further supports the learning channel. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/315191 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 4.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 6.625 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chen, Yangyang | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ng, Jeffrey | - |
dc.contributor.author | Yang, Xin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-08-05T10:17:59Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-08-05T10:17:59Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Accounting Research, 2021, v. 59, n. 5, p. 1609-1649 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0021-8456 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/315191 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine how options trading affects voluntary corporate disclosure, so that we can shed light on whether managers’ potential learning from the options market induces them to withhold disclosure. We find that options trading reduces the likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts, suggesting that firms that have active options trading on their stock make fewer voluntary disclosures. This finding is in accordance with the theoretical prediction that managers strategically reduce disclosure to avoid crowding out informed trading, which can give them informative feedback for their decision making. In support of the managerial learning channel, we document a real effect of reduced disclosure: When managers disclose less, options trading has a stronger positive effect on firm investment efficiency. The more pronounced effect of options trading on management earnings forecasts when the need for managerial learning is higher further supports the learning channel. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Accounting Research | - |
dc.subject | information feedback | - |
dc.subject | management earnings forecasts | - |
dc.subject | managerial learning | - |
dc.subject | options trading | - |
dc.subject | voluntary disclosure | - |
dc.title | Talk Less, Learn More: Strategic Disclosure in Response to Managerial Learning from the Options Market | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/1475-679X.12368 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85107440267 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 59 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 5 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1609 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 1649 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1475-679X | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000659703800001 | - |