In defence of a moral right to immigrate : explicating the moral importance of the right to immigrate from a moral commitment to the right to domestic migration and freedom of exit

Abstract

This thesis argues for a moral right to immigrate, that is, all private individuals have a moral right to enter and settle in a state of their own preference. The method adopted in this thesis is analytical reasoning. Specifically, my argument is one of logical extension: I am concerned with what inferences one should draw from a strong moral commitment—that everyone, regardless of citizenship or nationality, has a moral right to domestic migration within the state one resides in and a moral right to exit any state—to the question of immigration. The first part of the thesis establishes my positive argument for a moral right to immigrate. I argue that, since the same moral values underlie domestic and international migration, those with a strong commitment to the right to domestic migration should also recognize a moral right to international migration. I have also established the duties the receiving state owes to potential immigrants and new immigrants: a duty not to prevent potential immigrants from entering, settling and accessing opportunities within its territories, duties of reciprocity, and a duty to help poor new immigrants when the state is one of a few institutions capable of providing assistance. This contributes to the debate by establishing both the ‘right’ and ‘duty’ side of the moral right to immigrate, and by responding to alleged differences between domestic and international migration. The latter part of the thesis addresses two important objections to ‘open borders’. Chapter III challenges the collective self-determination arguments for immigration control. I argue for a ‘two-level theory of morally legitimate authority’: on one level, a democratic state has extensive authority over its own citizens on the basis that the acts of the state are expressions of their collective-self-determination; on the other level, we need a different principle that explains why non-citizens should respect the authority of the state. Since the state does not represent non-citizens, the principle that justifies a state’s exercise of power over non-citizens is narrower than the democratic principle. Chapter IV rebuts the compatriot partiality arguments for immigration control. I argue that, since permissible partiality to our compatriots supports immigration and emigration restrictions equally, my opponents must either abandon the compatriot partiality argument for immigration control or justify emigration control. As such, this thesis also contributes by providing new arguments in response to important objections to ‘open borders’.