File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1103/PhysRevA.83.012322
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-79251521840
- WOS: WOS:000286743100001
- Find via
Supplementary
- Citations:
- Appears in Collections:
Article: Insecurity of position-based quantum-cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks
Title | Insecurity of position-based quantum-cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2011 |
Citation | Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics, 2011, v. 83, n. 1, article no. 012322 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Recently, position-based quantum cryptography has been claimed to be unconditionally secure. On the contrary, here we show that the existing proposals for position-based quantum cryptography are, in fact, insecure if entanglement is shared among two adversaries. Specifically, we demonstrate how the adversaries can incorporate ideas of quantum teleportation and quantum secret sharing to compromise the security with certainty. The common flaw to all current protocols is that the Pauli operators always map a codeword to a codeword (up to an irrelevant overall phase). We propose a modified scheme lacking this property in which the same cheating strategy used to undermine the previous protocols can succeed with a rate of at most 85%. We prove the modified protocol is secure when the shared quantum resource between the adversaries is a two- or three-level system. © 2011 American Physical Society. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/285923 |
ISSN | 2014 Impact Factor: 2.808 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Lau, Hoi Kwan | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lo, Hoi Kwong | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-18T04:57:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-18T04:57:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics, 2011, v. 83, n. 1, article no. 012322 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1050-2947 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/285923 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Recently, position-based quantum cryptography has been claimed to be unconditionally secure. On the contrary, here we show that the existing proposals for position-based quantum cryptography are, in fact, insecure if entanglement is shared among two adversaries. Specifically, we demonstrate how the adversaries can incorporate ideas of quantum teleportation and quantum secret sharing to compromise the security with certainty. The common flaw to all current protocols is that the Pauli operators always map a codeword to a codeword (up to an irrelevant overall phase). We propose a modified scheme lacking this property in which the same cheating strategy used to undermine the previous protocols can succeed with a rate of at most 85%. We prove the modified protocol is secure when the shared quantum resource between the adversaries is a two- or three-level system. © 2011 American Physical Society. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics | - |
dc.title | Insecurity of position-based quantum-cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1103/PhysRevA.83.012322 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-79251521840 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 83 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | article no. 012322 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | article no. 012322 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1094-1622 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000286743100001 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1050-2947 | - |