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Article: Insecurity of position-based quantum-cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks

TitleInsecurity of position-based quantum-cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks
Authors
Issue Date2011
Citation
Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics, 2011, v. 83, n. 1, article no. 012322 How to Cite?
AbstractRecently, position-based quantum cryptography has been claimed to be unconditionally secure. On the contrary, here we show that the existing proposals for position-based quantum cryptography are, in fact, insecure if entanglement is shared among two adversaries. Specifically, we demonstrate how the adversaries can incorporate ideas of quantum teleportation and quantum secret sharing to compromise the security with certainty. The common flaw to all current protocols is that the Pauli operators always map a codeword to a codeword (up to an irrelevant overall phase). We propose a modified scheme lacking this property in which the same cheating strategy used to undermine the previous protocols can succeed with a rate of at most 85%. We prove the modified protocol is secure when the shared quantum resource between the adversaries is a two- or three-level system. © 2011 American Physical Society.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285923
ISSN
2014 Impact Factor: 2.808
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLau, Hoi Kwan-
dc.contributor.authorLo, Hoi Kwong-
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-18T04:57:00Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-18T04:57:00Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.citationPhysical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics, 2011, v. 83, n. 1, article no. 012322-
dc.identifier.issn1050-2947-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285923-
dc.description.abstractRecently, position-based quantum cryptography has been claimed to be unconditionally secure. On the contrary, here we show that the existing proposals for position-based quantum cryptography are, in fact, insecure if entanglement is shared among two adversaries. Specifically, we demonstrate how the adversaries can incorporate ideas of quantum teleportation and quantum secret sharing to compromise the security with certainty. The common flaw to all current protocols is that the Pauli operators always map a codeword to a codeword (up to an irrelevant overall phase). We propose a modified scheme lacking this property in which the same cheating strategy used to undermine the previous protocols can succeed with a rate of at most 85%. We prove the modified protocol is secure when the shared quantum resource between the adversaries is a two- or three-level system. © 2011 American Physical Society.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofPhysical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics-
dc.titleInsecurity of position-based quantum-cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1103/PhysRevA.83.012322-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-79251521840-
dc.identifier.volume83-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spagearticle no. 012322-
dc.identifier.epagearticle no. 012322-
dc.identifier.eissn1094-1622-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000286743100001-
dc.identifier.issnl1050-2947-

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