Unconditionally secure key distillation from multi-photons in a single-photon polarization based quantum key distribution

Abstract

In this presentation, we show some counter-examples to a naive belief that the security of QKD is based on no-cloning theorem. One example is shown by explicitly proving that one can indeed generate an unconditionally secure key from Alice's two-photon emission part in "SARG04 protocol" proposed by V. Scarani et al., in Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004). This protocol differs from BB84 only in the classical communication. It is, thus, interesting to see how only the classical communication of QKD protocol might qualitatively change its security. We also show that one can generate an unconditionally secure key from the single to the four-photon part in a generalized SARG04 that uses six states. Finally, we also compare the bit error rate threshold of these protocols with the one in BB84 and the original six-state protocol assuming a depolarizing channel.