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Article: Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations

TitleCorporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations
Authors
Bourveau, ThomasShe, GuomanŽaldokas, Alminas
Keywordstacit coordination
antitrust enforcement
collusion
financial disclosure
Issue Date2020
Citation
Journal of Accounting Research, 2020, v. 58, n. 2, p. 295-332 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12301
Abstract© University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2020 We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285862
ISSN
0021-8456
2021 Impact Factor: 4.446
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 6.767
SSRN
3622557
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000523209300001

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBourveau, Thomas-
dc.contributor.authorShe, Guoman-
dc.contributor.authorŽaldokas, Alminas-
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-18T04:56:50Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-18T04:56:50Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Accounting Research, 2020, v. 58, n. 2, p. 295-332-
dc.identifier.issn0021-8456-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285862-
dc.description.abstract© University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2020 We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Accounting Research-
dc.subjecttacit coordination-
dc.subjectantitrust enforcement-
dc.subjectcollusion-
dc.subjectfinancial disclosure-
dc.titleCorporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1475-679X.12301-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85082945750-
dc.identifier.volume58-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage295-
dc.identifier.epage332-
dc.identifier.eissn1475-679X-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000523209300001-
dc.identifier.ssrn3622557-
dc.identifier.issnl0021-8456-

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