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Conference Paper: Quantum cryptography with malicious devices

TitleQuantum cryptography with malicious devices
Authors
KeywordsCovert channels
Quantum cryptography
Quantum key distribution
Side-channel attacks
Untrusted classical post-processing units
Memory attacks
Quantum communication
Issue Date2018
Citation
Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering, 2018, v. 10803 How to Cite?
Abstract© 2018 SPIE. The current paradigm for the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) relies on the legitimate users of the system trusting their devices, which include both the quantum communication components and the classical post-processing units. However, in view of the memory attacks recently proposed against device-independent QKD, as well as the many hardware and software Trojan Horse attacks that threaten the security of conventional cryptography today, such trust is a very strong and unjustified assumption. Here we review a recent proposal to solve this problem based on the use of verifiable secret sharing and redundancies. We show that this approach can deliver secret key rates which are comparable to those obtained in an ideal scenario with honest devices.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285821
ISSN
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.152
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCurty, Marcos-
dc.contributor.authorLo, Hoi Kwong-
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-18T04:56:44Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-18T04:56:44Z-
dc.date.issued2018-
dc.identifier.citationProceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering, 2018, v. 10803-
dc.identifier.issn0277-786X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285821-
dc.description.abstract© 2018 SPIE. The current paradigm for the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) relies on the legitimate users of the system trusting their devices, which include both the quantum communication components and the classical post-processing units. However, in view of the memory attacks recently proposed against device-independent QKD, as well as the many hardware and software Trojan Horse attacks that threaten the security of conventional cryptography today, such trust is a very strong and unjustified assumption. Here we review a recent proposal to solve this problem based on the use of verifiable secret sharing and redundancies. We show that this approach can deliver secret key rates which are comparable to those obtained in an ideal scenario with honest devices.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering-
dc.subjectCovert channels-
dc.subjectQuantum cryptography-
dc.subjectQuantum key distribution-
dc.subjectSide-channel attacks-
dc.subjectUntrusted classical post-processing units-
dc.subjectMemory attacks-
dc.subjectQuantum communication-
dc.titleQuantum cryptography with malicious devices-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1117/12.2502066-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85057325008-
dc.identifier.volume10803-
dc.identifier.spagenull-
dc.identifier.epagenull-
dc.identifier.eissn1996-756X-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000452820800001-
dc.identifier.issnl0277-786X-

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