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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00295.x
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-48249091672
- WOS: WOS:000258184400003
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Article: Keynesian beauty contest, accounting disclosure, and market efficiency
Title | Keynesian beauty contest, accounting disclosure, and market efficiency |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2008 |
Citation | Journal of Accounting Research, 2008, v. 46, n. 4, p. 785-807 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper examines the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, an influential metaphor originally proposed by Keynes [1936] and recently formalized by Allen, Morris, and Shin [2006]. In such markets, public information plays an additional commonality role, biasing stock prices away from the consensus fundamental value toward public information. Despite this bias, I demonstrate that provisions of public information always drive stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Hence, as a main source of public information, accounting disclosure enhances market efficiency, and transparency should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect. ©, 2008 University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/285625 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 4.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 6.625 |
SSRN | |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Gao, Pingyang | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-18T04:56:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-18T04:56:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Accounting Research, 2008, v. 46, n. 4, p. 785-807 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0021-8456 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/285625 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, an influential metaphor originally proposed by Keynes [1936] and recently formalized by Allen, Morris, and Shin [2006]. In such markets, public information plays an additional commonality role, biasing stock prices away from the consensus fundamental value toward public information. Despite this bias, I demonstrate that provisions of public information always drive stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Hence, as a main source of public information, accounting disclosure enhances market efficiency, and transparency should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect. ©, 2008 University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Accounting Research | - |
dc.title | Keynesian beauty contest, accounting disclosure, and market efficiency | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00295.x | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-48249091672 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 46 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 785 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 807 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1475-679X | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000258184400003 | - |
dc.identifier.ssrn | 1081008 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0021-8456 | - |