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- Publisher Website: 10.1257/aer.20180412
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Article: Does Regulatory Jurisdiction Affect the Quality of Investment-Adviser Regulation?
Title | Does Regulatory Jurisdiction Affect the Quality of Investment-Adviser Regulation? |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Mortgage Default Mortgage-backed Securities Foreclosure |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Publisher | American Economic Association. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php |
Citation | The American Economic Review, 2019, v. 109 n. 10, p. 3681-3712 How to Cite? |
Abstract | The Dodd-Frank Act shifted regulatory jurisdiction over 'midsize' investment advisers from the SEC to state-securities regulators. Client complaints against midsize advisers increased relative to those continuing under SEC oversight by 30 to 40 percent of the unconditional probability. Complaints increasingly cited fiduciary violations and rose more where state regulators had fewer resources. Advisers responding more to weaker oversight had past complaints, were located farther from regulators, faced less competition, had more conflicts of interest, and served primarily less-sophisticated clients. Our results inform optimal regulatory design in markets with informational asymmetries and search frictions. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/284503 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 10.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 22.344 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Charoenwong, B | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kwan, A | - |
dc.contributor.author | Umar, T | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-07T08:58:35Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-07T08:58:35Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | The American Economic Review, 2019, v. 109 n. 10, p. 3681-3712 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0002-8282 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/284503 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The Dodd-Frank Act shifted regulatory jurisdiction over 'midsize' investment advisers from the SEC to state-securities regulators. Client complaints against midsize advisers increased relative to those continuing under SEC oversight by 30 to 40 percent of the unconditional probability. Complaints increasingly cited fiduciary violations and rose more where state regulators had fewer resources. Advisers responding more to weaker oversight had past complaints, were located farther from regulators, faced less competition, had more conflicts of interest, and served primarily less-sophisticated clients. Our results inform optimal regulatory design in markets with informational asymmetries and search frictions. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | American Economic Association. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | The American Economic Review | - |
dc.rights | The American Economic Review. Copyright © American Economic Association. | - |
dc.subject | Mortgage Default | - |
dc.subject | Mortgage-backed Securities | - |
dc.subject | Foreclosure | - |
dc.title | Does Regulatory Jurisdiction Affect the Quality of Investment-Adviser Regulation? | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Kwan, A: apkwan@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Kwan, A=rp02306 | - |
dc.description.nature | published_or_final_version | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/aer.20180412 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85072804368 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 312336 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 109 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 10 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 3681 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 3712 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000488277700009 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0002-8282 | - |