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Article: Disguised Corruption: Evidence from Consumer Credit in China

TitleDisguised Corruption: Evidence from Consumer Credit in China
Authors
KeywordsCorruption
Credit cards
Credit
Debt
Household finance
Issue Date2020
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfec
Citation
Journal of Financial Economics, 2020, v. 137 n. 2, p. 430-450 How to Cite?
AbstractUsing a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats’ delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/283985
ISSN
2019 Impact Factor: 5.731
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 9.920
SSRN
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAgarwal, S-
dc.contributor.authorQian, W-
dc.contributor.authorSeru, A-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, J-
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-20T05:55:06Z-
dc.date.available2020-07-20T05:55:06Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Financial Economics, 2020, v. 137 n. 2, p. 430-450-
dc.identifier.issn0304-405X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/283985-
dc.description.abstractUsing a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats’ delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfec-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Financial Economics-
dc.subjectCorruption-
dc.subjectCredit cards-
dc.subjectCredit-
dc.subjectDebt-
dc.subjectHousehold finance-
dc.titleDisguised Corruption: Evidence from Consumer Credit in China-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailZhang, J: zhangj1@HKUCC-COM.hku.hk-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.03.002-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85083692398-
dc.identifier.hkuros310796-
dc.identifier.volume137-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage430-
dc.identifier.epage450-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000542210000006-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlands-
dc.identifier.ssrn3152892-

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