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Article: Bureaucratic slack in China: The Anti-corruption campaign and the decline of patronage networks in developing local economies
Title | Bureaucratic slack in China: The Anti-corruption campaign and the decline of patronage networks in developing local economies |
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Authors | |
Keywords | anti-corruption bureaucratic slack corruption economic development extravagant position-related consumption |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press for School of Oriental and African Studies. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CQY |
Citation | The China Quarterly, 2020, v. 243, p. 611-634 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This article presents a qualitative empirical study of the impact of corruption and anti-corruption on the efficiency of China's bureaucratic system in developing a local economy. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and 98 days of participant observation, it first investigates the significance of extravagant position-related consumption in building personalized bureaucratic ties (patronage networks) and mobilizing resources for local economic development. It then examines the causal link between President Xi's campaign against corruption and extravagance and the rise of bureaucratic slack in local governments. The anti-extravagance campaign reduces the level of corruption in local government but it discourages local officials, who are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid risk and ensure political survival, from using banquets and gift-giving to build patronage networks, attract investment and mobilize development resources. The article concludes that corruption may contribute positively to the efficiency of a fragmented Chinese bureaucracy in fostering development at the local level, while the anti-corruption campaign compels local cadres to develop a new coping strategy – bureaucratic slack – for implementing policies and developing local economies. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/275751 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.716 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Wang, P | - |
dc.contributor.author | Yan, X | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-09-10T02:48:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-09-10T02:48:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | The China Quarterly, 2020, v. 243, p. 611-634 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0305-7410 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/275751 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This article presents a qualitative empirical study of the impact of corruption and anti-corruption on the efficiency of China's bureaucratic system in developing a local economy. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and 98 days of participant observation, it first investigates the significance of extravagant position-related consumption in building personalized bureaucratic ties (patronage networks) and mobilizing resources for local economic development. It then examines the causal link between President Xi's campaign against corruption and extravagance and the rise of bureaucratic slack in local governments. The anti-extravagance campaign reduces the level of corruption in local government but it discourages local officials, who are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid risk and ensure political survival, from using banquets and gift-giving to build patronage networks, attract investment and mobilize development resources. The article concludes that corruption may contribute positively to the efficiency of a fragmented Chinese bureaucracy in fostering development at the local level, while the anti-corruption campaign compels local cadres to develop a new coping strategy – bureaucratic slack – for implementing policies and developing local economies. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press for School of Oriental and African Studies. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CQY | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | The China Quarterly | - |
dc.rights | The China Quarterly. Copyright © Cambridge University Press for School of Oriental and African Studies. | - |
dc.rights | This article has been published in a revised form in [Journal] [http://doi.org/XXX]. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © copyright holder. | - |
dc.subject | anti-corruption | - |
dc.subject | bureaucratic slack | - |
dc.subject | corruption | - |
dc.subject | economic development | - |
dc.subject | extravagant position-related consumption | - |
dc.title | Bureaucratic slack in China: The Anti-corruption campaign and the decline of patronage networks in developing local economies | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Wang, P: pengwang@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Wang, P=rp01936 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0305741019001504 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85091258579 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 303770 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 243 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 611 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 634 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000582160300001 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0305-7410 | - |