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Article: Bureaucratic slack in China: Anti-corruption and the decline of patronage networks in developing local economies

TitleBureaucratic slack in China: Anti-corruption and the decline of patronage networks in developing local economies
Authors
Issue Date2019
PublisherCambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CQY
Citation
The China Quarterly,  How to Cite?
AbstractThis article presents a qualitative empirical study of the impact of corruption and anti-corruption on the efficiency of Chinese bureaucracy in developing a local economy. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and 98 days of participant observation, it first investigates the significance of extravagant position-related consumption in building personalized bureaucratic ties (patronage networks) and mobilizing resources for local economic development. It then examines the causal link between President Xi’s campaign against corruption and extravagance and the rise of bureaucratic slack in local governments. The anti-extravagance campaign reduces the level of corruption in local government, but it discourages local officials, who are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid risk and ensure political survival, from using banquets and gift-giving to build patronage networks, attract investment and mobilize development resources. The article concludes that corruption may contribute positively to the efficiency of fragmented Chinese bureaucracy in fostering development at the local level, while anti-corruption compels local cadres to develop a new coping strategy—bureaucratic slack—for implementing policies and developing local economies.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/275751

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWang, P-
dc.contributor.authorYAN, X-
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-10T02:48:57Z-
dc.date.available2019-09-10T02:48:57Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationThe China Quarterly, -
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/275751-
dc.description.abstractThis article presents a qualitative empirical study of the impact of corruption and anti-corruption on the efficiency of Chinese bureaucracy in developing a local economy. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and 98 days of participant observation, it first investigates the significance of extravagant position-related consumption in building personalized bureaucratic ties (patronage networks) and mobilizing resources for local economic development. It then examines the causal link between President Xi’s campaign against corruption and extravagance and the rise of bureaucratic slack in local governments. The anti-extravagance campaign reduces the level of corruption in local government, but it discourages local officials, who are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid risk and ensure political survival, from using banquets and gift-giving to build patronage networks, attract investment and mobilize development resources. The article concludes that corruption may contribute positively to the efficiency of fragmented Chinese bureaucracy in fostering development at the local level, while anti-corruption compels local cadres to develop a new coping strategy—bureaucratic slack—for implementing policies and developing local economies.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherCambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CQY-
dc.relation.ispartofThe China Quarterly-
dc.rightsThe China Quarterly. Copyright © Cambridge University Press.-
dc.rightsThis article has been published in a revised form in [Journal] [http://doi.org/XXX]. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © copyright holder.-
dc.titleBureaucratic slack in China: Anti-corruption and the decline of patronage networks in developing local economies-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailWang, P: pengwang@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityWang, P=rp01936-
dc.identifier.hkuros303770-

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