File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking

TitleDeflating Deflationary Truthmaking
Authors
KeywordsTruthmaking
Truth
Deflationism
Dependence
B-schema
T-schema
Issue Date2019
PublisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://pq.oxfordjournals.org
Citation
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2019, article no. pqz036 How to Cite?
AbstractIn this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in the work of Dodd, Hornsby, Schnieder, Williamson, and others. These philosophers believe that the ambitions of truthmaker theory are easily satisfied, without recourse to ambitious ontological investigation—hence the analogy with deflationary truth. We argue that the deflationists’ agenda fails: there is no coherent deflationary theory of truthmaking. Truthmaking, once deflated, fails to address the questions at the heart of truthmaking investigation. Truthmaking cannot be had on the cheap.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/272528
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.062

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAsay, J-
dc.contributor.authorBaron, S-
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-20T10:44:00Z-
dc.date.available2019-07-20T10:44:00Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationThe Philosophical Quarterly, 2019, article no. pqz036-
dc.identifier.issn0031-8094-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/272528-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in the work of Dodd, Hornsby, Schnieder, Williamson, and others. These philosophers believe that the ambitions of truthmaker theory are easily satisfied, without recourse to ambitious ontological investigation—hence the analogy with deflationary truth. We argue that the deflationists’ agenda fails: there is no coherent deflationary theory of truthmaking. Truthmaking, once deflated, fails to address the questions at the heart of truthmaking investigation. Truthmaking cannot be had on the cheap.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://pq.oxfordjournals.org-
dc.relation.ispartofThe Philosophical Quarterly-
dc.subjectTruthmaking-
dc.subjectTruth-
dc.subjectDeflationism-
dc.subjectDependence-
dc.subjectB-schema-
dc.subjectT-schema-
dc.titleDeflating Deflationary Truthmaking-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailAsay, J: asay@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityAsay, J=rp01955-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/pq/pqz036-
dc.identifier.hkuros299194-
dc.identifier.spagearticle no. pqz036-
dc.identifier.epagearticle no. pqz036-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats