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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.027
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85042322081
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Article: Liability and reputation in credence goods markets
Title | Liability and reputation in credence goods markets |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Credence goods Repeated purchase Liability Reputation |
Issue Date | 2018 |
Citation | Economics Letters, 2018, v. 166, p. 35-39 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © 2018 This paper studies the impact of liability on a credence-good seller's incentives to maintain a good reputation. Credence-good markets are characterized by information asymmetry about the value of sellers’ services to consumers who must rely on sellers for diagnosis and treatment provision. Liability refers to the legal environment in which the seller is liable for fixing consumers’ problems after charging them the price for his treatment. When the seller is short-lived, liability mitigates information asymmetry and facilitates trade. Nevertheless, liability may undermine a long-lived seller's incentive to maintain a good reputation and reduces market efficiency. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269656 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.1 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.729 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Fong, Yuk fai | - |
dc.contributor.author | Liu, Ting | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-30T01:49:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-04-30T01:49:12Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Economics Letters, 2018, v. 166, p. 35-39 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-1765 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269656 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © 2018 This paper studies the impact of liability on a credence-good seller's incentives to maintain a good reputation. Credence-good markets are characterized by information asymmetry about the value of sellers’ services to consumers who must rely on sellers for diagnosis and treatment provision. Liability refers to the legal environment in which the seller is liable for fixing consumers’ problems after charging them the price for his treatment. When the seller is short-lived, liability mitigates information asymmetry and facilitates trade. Nevertheless, liability may undermine a long-lived seller's incentive to maintain a good reputation and reduces market efficiency. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Economics Letters | - |
dc.subject | Credence goods | - |
dc.subject | Repeated purchase | - |
dc.subject | Liability | - |
dc.subject | Reputation | - |
dc.title | Liability and reputation in credence goods markets | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.027 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85042322081 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 166 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 35 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 39 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000429761600008 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0165-1765 | - |