Governing innovation in China : institutions, policies, and outcomes

Abstract

How does China, an authoritarian regime accustomed to state-directed development, adapt to the challenges of governing the innovation economy? The question begs the puzzle that whether the difference in policies leads to an imbalance in the development of innovation economy. The puzzle is examined from the public policy angle, credit claiming and blame avoidance. To examine how local officials approach innovation economy and what institutional choices they subsequently make to govern the sector, this thesis maps national data and the evolving institutions in Tianjin for innovation economy. This thesis combines both quantitative and qualitative analyses that include observations from macro to micro. In the quantitative analysis, a range of factors representing the innovation environment are independent variables, whereas a range of factors representing the performance of start-ups in provinces are dependent variables. The qualitative analysis portrays in detail how the Tianjin officials’ attitudes – be it credit claiming or blame avoiding – influence local socio-economic conditions and institutions. The finding shows more government expenditure and media exposure significantly contribute to the local mass innovation, which proves government capacity for promoting mass innovation under control. The conclusion of thesis is that credit claiming and blame avoidance is valid framework for studying mass innovation in China. Future research should do more field works to explore unexplained links between local officials’ preference, innovation policies’ quality and the central government’s expectation.