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- Publisher Website: 10.1093/isq/sqx036
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85040569086
- WOS: WOS:000419599000012
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Article: Entry, Vulnerability, and Trade Policy: Why Some Autocrats Like International Trade
Title | Entry, Vulnerability, and Trade Policy: Why Some Autocrats Like International Trade |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option D. The Journal's web site is located at http://isq.oxfordjournals.org/ |
Citation | International Studies Quarterly, 2017, v. 61, p. 892-906 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Why are some autocracies more open to trade than others? And why are autocratic trade policies so volatile? Despite wide variation in how autocracies approach international trade, existing research offers few answers to these questions. We argue that the trade policies of autocratic regimes depend in part on the mode of entry of their leaders. Autocrats can enter power either legally—according to established rules of succession—or extralegally, through a palace revolt or coup. These different modes of entry lead to different posttransition politics and trade policies. Because new extralegal leaders are outsiders with limited resources, they are vulnerable to coups by other ruling elites. They reduce this vulnerability by building public support via lower tariffs. However, as they consolidate their rule, they reverse these initial tariff cuts. Extralegal entries thus lead to foreign economic policies that are more “cooperative” in the short run but more volatile in the long run. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/261138 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.497 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chow, W | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kono, YK | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-09-14T08:53:08Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-09-14T08:53:08Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | International Studies Quarterly, 2017, v. 61, p. 892-906 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0020-8833 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/261138 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Why are some autocracies more open to trade than others? And why are autocratic trade policies so volatile? Despite wide variation in how autocracies approach international trade, existing research offers few answers to these questions. We argue that the trade policies of autocratic regimes depend in part on the mode of entry of their leaders. Autocrats can enter power either legally—according to established rules of succession—or extralegally, through a palace revolt or coup. These different modes of entry lead to different posttransition politics and trade policies. Because new extralegal leaders are outsiders with limited resources, they are vulnerable to coups by other ruling elites. They reduce this vulnerability by building public support via lower tariffs. However, as they consolidate their rule, they reverse these initial tariff cuts. Extralegal entries thus lead to foreign economic policies that are more “cooperative” in the short run but more volatile in the long run. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option D. The Journal's web site is located at http://isq.oxfordjournals.org/ | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Studies Quarterly | - |
dc.title | Entry, Vulnerability, and Trade Policy: Why Some Autocrats Like International Trade | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Chow, W: wilfred.chow@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Chow, W=rp02057 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/isq/sqx036 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85040569086 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 291149 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 61 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 892 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 906 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000419599000012 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0020-8833 | - |