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Article: Inequality of land tenure and revolutionary outcome: An economic analysis of China's land reform of 1946-1952

TitleInequality of land tenure and revolutionary outcome: An economic analysis of China's land reform of 1946-1952
Authors
KeywordsChina
Tenure inequality
Revolutionary outcome
Land reform
Issue Date2012
Citation
Explorations in Economic History, 2012, v. 49, n. 4, p. 482-497 How to Cite?
AbstractA paradoxical feature of China's land reform of 1946-1952 is that it was conducted far more radically in the north, where land tenure relations were far less unequal, than in the south where inequality of land tenure was distinctly more acute. That landlords could only be identified in south China was attributable to the sharply more active land rental market there, and the "single-cut" policy of defining the landlords narrowly as a rentier class. We attribute the predominance of an active land rental market in south China to three socioeconomic characteristics: 1) a sharply higher inequality in land distribution, 2) an organization of agriculture whose efficiency required the "unsupervised initiatives" of family labor, and 3) a distinctly higher proportion of "absentee landlords". Our hypothesis of land rentals being the only variable distinguishing the landlords from the rich peasants and only in south China is strongly supported by empirical evidence. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/257119
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.0
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.306

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKung, James Kai sing-
dc.contributor.authorWu, Xiaogang-
dc.contributor.authorWu, Yuxiao-
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-24T08:58:53Z-
dc.date.available2018-07-24T08:58:53Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.citationExplorations in Economic History, 2012, v. 49, n. 4, p. 482-497-
dc.identifier.issn0014-4983-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/257119-
dc.description.abstractA paradoxical feature of China's land reform of 1946-1952 is that it was conducted far more radically in the north, where land tenure relations were far less unequal, than in the south where inequality of land tenure was distinctly more acute. That landlords could only be identified in south China was attributable to the sharply more active land rental market there, and the "single-cut" policy of defining the landlords narrowly as a rentier class. We attribute the predominance of an active land rental market in south China to three socioeconomic characteristics: 1) a sharply higher inequality in land distribution, 2) an organization of agriculture whose efficiency required the "unsupervised initiatives" of family labor, and 3) a distinctly higher proportion of "absentee landlords". Our hypothesis of land rentals being the only variable distinguishing the landlords from the rich peasants and only in south China is strongly supported by empirical evidence. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofExplorations in Economic History-
dc.subjectChina-
dc.subjectTenure inequality-
dc.subjectRevolutionary outcome-
dc.subjectLand reform-
dc.titleInequality of land tenure and revolutionary outcome: An economic analysis of China's land reform of 1946-1952-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.eeh.2012.07.001-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84866466435-
dc.identifier.volume49-
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage482-
dc.identifier.epage497-
dc.identifier.eissn1090-2457-

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