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Article: Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?

TitleWhy do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?
Authors
KeywordsCEO power
CFO turnover
Earnings quality
Incentive compensation
Accounting manipulation
Issue Date2011
Citation
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2011, v. 51, n. 1-2, p. 21-36 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of manipulation firms have higher equity incentives and more power than CEOs of matched firms. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the explanation that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek immediate personal financial benefit from their equity incentives. AAER content analysis reinforces this conclusion. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/257055
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.535
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 6.834

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFeng, Mei-
dc.contributor.authorGe, Weili-
dc.contributor.authorLuo, Shuqing-
dc.contributor.authorShevlin, Terry-
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-24T08:58:42Z-
dc.date.available2018-07-24T08:58:42Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Accounting and Economics, 2011, v. 51, n. 1-2, p. 21-36-
dc.identifier.issn0165-4101-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/257055-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of manipulation firms have higher equity incentives and more power than CEOs of matched firms. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the explanation that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek immediate personal financial benefit from their equity incentives. AAER content analysis reinforces this conclusion. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Accounting and Economics-
dc.subjectCEO power-
dc.subjectCFO turnover-
dc.subjectEarnings quality-
dc.subjectIncentive compensation-
dc.subjectAccounting manipulation-
dc.titleWhy do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.005-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-79951516282-
dc.identifier.volume51-
dc.identifier.issue1-2-
dc.identifier.spage21-
dc.identifier.epage36-

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