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Article: Bad is freer than good: Positive-negative asymmetry in attributions of free will

TitleBad is freer than good: Positive-negative asymmetry in attributions of free will
Authors
KeywordsOutcome valence
Free will
Attributions
Action valence
Accountability
Issue Date2016
Citation
Consciousness and Cognition, 2016, v. 42, p. 26-40 How to Cite?
Abstract© 2016 Elsevier Inc.. Recent findings support the idea that the belief in free will serves as the basis for moral responsibility, thus promoting the punishment of immoral agents. We theorized that free will extends beyond morality to serve as the basis for accountability and the capacity for change more broadly, not only for others but also for the self. Five experiments showed that people attributed higher freedom of will to negative than to positive valence, regardless of morality or intent, for both self and others. In recalling everyday life situations and in classical decision making paradigms, negative actions, negatives outcomes, and negative framing were attributed higher free will than positive ones. Free will attributions were mainly driven by action or outcome valence, but not intent. These findings show consistent support for the idea that free will underlies laypersons' sense-making for accountability and change under negative circumstances.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/250339
ISSN
2021 Impact Factor: 2.728
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.223
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFeldman, Gilad-
dc.contributor.authorWong, Kin Fai Ellick-
dc.contributor.authorBaumeister, Roy F.-
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-28T07:57:23Z-
dc.date.available2017-12-28T07:57:23Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.citationConsciousness and Cognition, 2016, v. 42, p. 26-40-
dc.identifier.issn1053-8100-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/250339-
dc.description.abstract© 2016 Elsevier Inc.. Recent findings support the idea that the belief in free will serves as the basis for moral responsibility, thus promoting the punishment of immoral agents. We theorized that free will extends beyond morality to serve as the basis for accountability and the capacity for change more broadly, not only for others but also for the self. Five experiments showed that people attributed higher freedom of will to negative than to positive valence, regardless of morality or intent, for both self and others. In recalling everyday life situations and in classical decision making paradigms, negative actions, negatives outcomes, and negative framing were attributed higher free will than positive ones. Free will attributions were mainly driven by action or outcome valence, but not intent. These findings show consistent support for the idea that free will underlies laypersons' sense-making for accountability and change under negative circumstances.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofConsciousness and Cognition-
dc.subjectOutcome valence-
dc.subjectFree will-
dc.subjectAttributions-
dc.subjectAction valence-
dc.subjectAccountability-
dc.titleBad is freer than good: Positive-negative asymmetry in attributions of free will-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.concog.2016.03.005-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84960349463-
dc.identifier.volume42-
dc.identifier.spage26-
dc.identifier.epage40-
dc.identifier.eissn1090-2376-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000377843300004-
dc.identifier.issnl1053-8100-

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