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Article: A Game-Theory Model of Democratization and Political Reform in Hong Kong

TitleA Game-Theory Model of Democratization and Political Reform in Hong Kong
Authors
Issue Date2016
PublisherTaiwan Foundation of Democracy. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tfd.org.tw/english/tjd.php
Citation
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 2016, v. 12, p. 127-154 How to Cite?
AbstractThis essay analyzes three attempts at political reform in post-handover Hong Kong by adapting game-theory models in studies of democratization. By modeling the strategic interactions and preferences of Beijing and the local democratic forces, the outcome of the political reform efforts are explained. As a conditioning factor in the model, it is argued that the strong strength of civil society in 2005 and 2015 ruled out any possible negotiation between the Beijing and the democrats, resulting in deadlocks and the eventual rejection of the proposals. In contrast, the weaker and apolitical nature of civil society in 2010 allowed moderate democrats to reach an agreement with Beijing over a proposed reform. This essay carries significant implications for Hong Kong-Beijing interactions, the political development of Hong Kong, as well as the literature on democratization.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/248775
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWong, MYH-
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-18T08:48:16Z-
dc.date.available2017-10-18T08:48:16Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.citationTaiwan Journal of Democracy, 2016, v. 12, p. 127-154-
dc.identifier.issn1815-7238-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/248775-
dc.description.abstractThis essay analyzes three attempts at political reform in post-handover Hong Kong by adapting game-theory models in studies of democratization. By modeling the strategic interactions and preferences of Beijing and the local democratic forces, the outcome of the political reform efforts are explained. As a conditioning factor in the model, it is argued that the strong strength of civil society in 2005 and 2015 ruled out any possible negotiation between the Beijing and the democrats, resulting in deadlocks and the eventual rejection of the proposals. In contrast, the weaker and apolitical nature of civil society in 2010 allowed moderate democrats to reach an agreement with Beijing over a proposed reform. This essay carries significant implications for Hong Kong-Beijing interactions, the political development of Hong Kong, as well as the literature on democratization.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherTaiwan Foundation of Democracy. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tfd.org.tw/english/tjd.php-
dc.relation.ispartofTaiwan Journal of Democracy-
dc.titleA Game-Theory Model of Democratization and Political Reform in Hong Kong-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailWong, MYH: yhmwong@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityWong, MYH=rp02085-
dc.identifier.hkuros280004-
dc.identifier.volume12-
dc.identifier.spage127-
dc.identifier.epage154-
dc.publisher.placeTaiwan-

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