File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Endogenous Entry to Security-bid Auctions

TitleEndogenous Entry to Security-bid Auctions
Authors
Issue Date2016
PublisherAmerican Economic Association. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php
Citation
The American Economic Review, 2016, v. 106 n. 11, p. 3577-3589 How to Cite?
AbstractWe endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any minimum reserve security-bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset's value when retained by the seller. DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues. (JEL D44).
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/247642
ISSN
2017 Impact Factor: 4.528
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 8.048
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSogo, T-
dc.contributor.authorBernhardt, D-
dc.contributor.authorLiu, T-
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-18T08:30:21Z-
dc.date.available2017-10-18T08:30:21Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.citationThe American Economic Review, 2016, v. 106 n. 11, p. 3577-3589-
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/247642-
dc.description.abstractWe endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any minimum reserve security-bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset's value when retained by the seller. DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues. (JEL D44).-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php-
dc.relation.ispartofThe American Economic Review-
dc.rightsThe American Economic Review. Copyright © American Economic Association.-
dc.titleEndogenous Entry to Security-bid Auctions-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailSogo, T: tjliu@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailLiu, T: tjliu@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authoritySogo, T=rp02221-
dc.identifier.authorityLiu, T=rp02221-
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/aer.20151538-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84994236098-
dc.identifier.hkuros280732-
dc.identifier.volume106-
dc.identifier.issue11-
dc.identifier.spage3577-
dc.identifier.epage3589-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000387342200011-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats