Selective Corruption Cleanups in Reform-era China

Abstract

Authoritarian regimes may voluntarily fight corruption to consolidate their rule and enhance regime legitimacy. However, anticorruption efforts are not necessarily based on the rule of law but follow certain political-economic logic. This research examines China, an authoritarian regime that has experienced rampant corruption since its market reforms started in the late 1970s. In face of widespread corruption in many government branches and various sectors, the Chinese Communist Party-state has launched waves of anticorruption campaigns that apparently have aimed at combating different types and areas of corruption. What are the targets of these campaigns throughout time and what purposes do these selected anticorruption targets serve? We employ a mixed research method to answer these questions. We compile a unique dataset combining the work reports by chief central and local prosecutors from 1998 to 2011 to identify primary areas targeted by the Chinese government’s anticorruption efforts. We find that the anticorruption emphases are correlated with the launching and implementation of major reform initiatives. In-depth case studies on officials charged of corruption further indicate that anticorruption campaigns serve as auxiliary tools to push forward socio-economic reforms, by removing either reform opportunists who abuse reform policies for private gains or reform opponents who resist reform agendas. We therefore contribute to the existing research on selective corruption cleanups in authoritarian regimes by showing that, instead of being purely driven by patronage networks and factional infightings, anticorruption campaigns serve the purpose of cleaning up obstacles to socioeconomic reforms.