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Conference Paper: Volition and the function of consciousness

TitleVolition and the function of consciousness
Authors
Issue Date2009
Citation
Faith and Philosophy, 2009, v. 26, n. 5 SPEC. ISSUE, p. 537-552 How to Cite?
AbstractPeople have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong signals but not the conscious experience of perception, perhaps we would find that such stimuli are just as effective in influencing volitional behavior.Copyright © 2009 The Society of Christian Philosophers. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/242590
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 0.4
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.238

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLau, Hakwan-
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-10T10:51:03Z-
dc.date.available2017-08-10T10:51:03Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.citationFaith and Philosophy, 2009, v. 26, n. 5 SPEC. ISSUE, p. 537-552-
dc.identifier.issn0739-7046-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/242590-
dc.description.abstractPeople have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong signals but not the conscious experience of perception, perhaps we would find that such stimuli are just as effective in influencing volitional behavior.Copyright © 2009 The Society of Christian Philosophers. All rights reserved.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofFaith and Philosophy-
dc.titleVolition and the function of consciousness-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84875422250-
dc.identifier.volume26-
dc.identifier.issue5 SPEC. ISSUE-
dc.identifier.spage537-
dc.identifier.epage552-
dc.identifier.eissn2153-3393-
dc.identifier.issnl0739-7046-

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