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Article: Agency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining

TitleAgency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining
Authors
Issue Date2004
Citation
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2004, v. 13, n. 4, p. 703-729 How to Cite?
AbstractIn the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the delegation relationship and where the seller tries to gain strategic advantage by imposing a minimum price above which she pays the delegate a commission. It is shown that incentives and commitment are substitutes. A low-type agent is given less discretion in dealing with the buyer and weaker incentives, while a high-type agent is given more discretion and stronger incentives.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241907
ISSN
2017 Impact Factor: 1.163
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.212
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCai, Hongbin-
dc.contributor.authorCont, Walter-
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-23T01:56:05Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-23T01:56:05Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2004, v. 13, n. 4, p. 703-729-
dc.identifier.issn1058-6407-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241907-
dc.description.abstractIn the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the delegation relationship and where the seller tries to gain strategic advantage by imposing a minimum price above which she pays the delegate a commission. It is shown that incentives and commitment are substitutes. A low-type agent is given less discretion in dealing with the buyer and weaker incentives, while a high-type agent is given more discretion and stronger incentives.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economics and Management Strategy-
dc.titleAgency problems and commitment in delegated bargaining-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00029.x-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-9444278380-
dc.identifier.volume13-
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage703-
dc.identifier.epage729-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000224433900007-

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