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Article: Family ties and organizational design: Evidence from Chinese private firms

TitleFamily ties and organizational design: Evidence from Chinese private firms
Authors
Issue Date2013
Citation
Review of Economics and Statistics, 2013, v. 95, n. 3, p. 850-867 How to Cite?
AbstractAnalyzing data from a unique survey of managers of Chinese private firms, we investigate how family ties with firm heads affect managerial compensation and job assignment. We find that family managers earn higher salaries and receive more bonuses, hold higher positions, and are given more decision rights and job responsibilities than nonfamily managers in the same firm. However, family managers face weaker incentives than professional managers, as seen in the lower sensitivity of their bonuses to firm performance. Our findings are consistent with the predictions of a principal-agent model that incorporates family trust and endogenous job assignment decisions. © 2013 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241900
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.979
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.629

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCai, Hongbin-
dc.contributor.authorLi, Hongbin-
dc.contributor.authorPark, Albert-
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Li An-
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-23T01:56:04Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-23T01:56:04Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationReview of Economics and Statistics, 2013, v. 95, n. 3, p. 850-867-
dc.identifier.issn0034-6535-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241900-
dc.description.abstractAnalyzing data from a unique survey of managers of Chinese private firms, we investigate how family ties with firm heads affect managerial compensation and job assignment. We find that family managers earn higher salaries and receive more bonuses, hold higher positions, and are given more decision rights and job responsibilities than nonfamily managers in the same firm. However, family managers face weaker incentives than professional managers, as seen in the lower sensitivity of their bonuses to firm performance. Our findings are consistent with the predictions of a principal-agent model that incorporates family trust and endogenous job assignment decisions. © 2013 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Economics and Statistics-
dc.titleFamily ties and organizational design: Evidence from Chinese private firms-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/REST_a_00268-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84885990827-
dc.identifier.volume95-
dc.identifier.issue3-
dc.identifier.spage850-
dc.identifier.epage867-
dc.identifier.eissn1530-9142-

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