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Article: Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency

TitleBargaining on Behalf of a Constituency
Authors
KeywordsBargaining; delegation; principal-agent; delay
Issue Date2000
Citation
Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, v. 92, n. 2, p. 234-273 How to Cite?
AbstractWe study bargaining situations in which one side consists of a group of people, who elect a representative to bargain with another party on their behalf. A two-phase bargaining model is developed in which a principal-agent problem between the constituency and its representative is embedded. With a natural refinement of sequential equilibrium, we characterize the set of equilibria and examine its efficiency properties. We show that agency problems in the delegation relationship rather than asymmetric information between the two bargainers can cause severe bargaining inefficiency (i.e., delay in reaching agreements). Extensions of the model and applications to union-firm bargaining are then discussed briefly. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D82, J52. © 2000 Academic Press.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241882
ISSN
2017 Impact Factor: 1.204
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.587
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCai, Hongbin-
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-23T01:55:59Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-23T01:55:59Z-
dc.date.issued2000-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory, 2000, v. 92, n. 2, p. 234-273-
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241882-
dc.description.abstractWe study bargaining situations in which one side consists of a group of people, who elect a representative to bargain with another party on their behalf. A two-phase bargaining model is developed in which a principal-agent problem between the constituency and its representative is embedded. With a natural refinement of sequential equilibrium, we characterize the set of equilibria and examine its efficiency properties. We show that agency problems in the delegation relationship rather than asymmetric information between the two bargainers can cause severe bargaining inefficiency (i.e., delay in reaching agreements). Extensions of the model and applications to union-firm bargaining are then discussed briefly. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D82, J52. © 2000 Academic Press.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Theory-
dc.subjectBargaining; delegation; principal-agent; delay-
dc.titleBargaining on Behalf of a Constituency-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/jeth.1999.2631-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0007107864-
dc.identifier.volume92-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage234-
dc.identifier.epage273-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000087756500003-

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