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Conference Paper: Big Tigers, Big Data: learning social reactions to China's unprecedented Anticorruption Campaign through online feedbacks

TitleBig Tigers, Big Data: learning social reactions to China's unprecedented Anticorruption Campaign through online feedbacks
Authors
KeywordsAnticorruption
Campaign-style enforcement
China
Public trust
Big data
Online
Issue Date2016
Citation
The 2016 HKU-USC-IPPA Conference on Public Policy (CPPHK), Hong Kong, 10-11 June 2016. How to Cite?
AbstractCorruption, commonly defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Nye 1967), undermines the economy, public trust in government, and regime legitimacy (Seligson 2002; Villoria, Ryzin, and Lavena 2013). Governments sometimes, to combat corruption, launch intensive campaigns (e.g. Manion 2004; Quah 1999), which involve extraordinary mobilization of administrative resources under strong political sponsorship (Liu, Lo, Zhan, and Wang 2015). In addition to strengthening regulatory enforcement, governments during anticorruption campaigns also aim to signal commitment against corruption and boost pubic support. While existing literature often focuses on evaluating the campaign effectiveness in terms of increasing policy compliance (e.g. Wedeman 2005), not much research has studied how well intensive anticorruption campaigns can help government win popular support. We attempt to fill ...
DescriptionPanel T06 - Special Topic: abstract no. T06-08
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/228817

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhu, J-
dc.contributor.authorHuang, H-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, D-
dc.date.accessioned2016-08-23T14:07:16Z-
dc.date.available2016-08-23T14:07:16Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.citationThe 2016 HKU-USC-IPPA Conference on Public Policy (CPPHK), Hong Kong, 10-11 June 2016.-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/228817-
dc.descriptionPanel T06 - Special Topic: abstract no. T06-08-
dc.description.abstractCorruption, commonly defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Nye 1967), undermines the economy, public trust in government, and regime legitimacy (Seligson 2002; Villoria, Ryzin, and Lavena 2013). Governments sometimes, to combat corruption, launch intensive campaigns (e.g. Manion 2004; Quah 1999), which involve extraordinary mobilization of administrative resources under strong political sponsorship (Liu, Lo, Zhan, and Wang 2015). In addition to strengthening regulatory enforcement, governments during anticorruption campaigns also aim to signal commitment against corruption and boost pubic support. While existing literature often focuses on evaluating the campaign effectiveness in terms of increasing policy compliance (e.g. Wedeman 2005), not much research has studied how well intensive anticorruption campaigns can help government win popular support. We attempt to fill ...-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofHKU-USC-IPPA Conference on Public Policy, CPPHK 2016-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectAnticorruption-
dc.subjectCampaign-style enforcement-
dc.subjectChina-
dc.subjectPublic trust-
dc.subjectBig data-
dc.subjectOnline-
dc.titleBig Tigers, Big Data: learning social reactions to China's unprecedented Anticorruption Campaign through online feedbacks-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailZhu, J: zhujn@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityZhu, J=rp01624-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.hkuros260195-

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