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Article: The judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom: A public choice analysis

TitleThe judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom: A public choice analysis
Authors
KeywordsCivil rights
Issue Date2014
Citation
European Journal of Law and Economics, 2014, v. 37, n. 2, p. 221-247 How to Cite?
AbstractThe Human Rights Act 1998 unprecedentedly enabled the senior courts in the United Kingdom to review parliamentary enactments for compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. This article seeks to analyze within the framework of public choice economics two phenomena arising from this development that are counterintuitive: What made Parliament voluntarily invite the judiciary to monitor its acts? Why has Parliament consistently complied with rulings of the Judicial House of Lords that challenged primary legislation over the last 10 years? It argues that the Act was designed in a way that fulfilled the electoral commitments of the enacting majority by supplying promised policies to its constituencies, while minimizing agency costs and information problems in favor of Parliament's corporate interests. Significantly, the Act left intact the veto powers of Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. As such, it disincentivized the Judicial House of Lords to risk costly overturns of its rulings by Parliament for straying too far from the range of the ideal policy positions spanned by Parliament and Strasbourg. Drawing from the empirical evidence of the past decade, it will be shown that in nearly all cases the Law Lords have either upheld the compatibility of challenged statutes, reaffirmed parliamentary preferences, or followed the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/228182
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.454
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.264

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorIp, Eric C.-
dc.date.accessioned2016-08-01T06:45:23Z-
dc.date.available2016-08-01T06:45:23Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Journal of Law and Economics, 2014, v. 37, n. 2, p. 221-247-
dc.identifier.issn0929-1261-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/228182-
dc.description.abstractThe Human Rights Act 1998 unprecedentedly enabled the senior courts in the United Kingdom to review parliamentary enactments for compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. This article seeks to analyze within the framework of public choice economics two phenomena arising from this development that are counterintuitive: What made Parliament voluntarily invite the judiciary to monitor its acts? Why has Parliament consistently complied with rulings of the Judicial House of Lords that challenged primary legislation over the last 10 years? It argues that the Act was designed in a way that fulfilled the electoral commitments of the enacting majority by supplying promised policies to its constituencies, while minimizing agency costs and information problems in favor of Parliament's corporate interests. Significantly, the Act left intact the veto powers of Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. As such, it disincentivized the Judicial House of Lords to risk costly overturns of its rulings by Parliament for straying too far from the range of the ideal policy positions spanned by Parliament and Strasbourg. Drawing from the empirical evidence of the past decade, it will be shown that in nearly all cases the Law Lords have either upheld the compatibility of challenged statutes, reaffirmed parliamentary preferences, or followed the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Law and Economics-
dc.subjectCivil rights-
dc.titleThe judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom: A public choice analysis-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10657-011-9281-4-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84897602505-
dc.identifier.volume37-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage221-
dc.identifier.epage247-

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