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Article: Putting Pluralism in its Place

TitlePutting Pluralism in its Place
Authors
Issue Date2016
Citation
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2016 How to Cite?
AbstractPluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to pluralism that challenges its fundamental commitment to there being a set of alethic properties in virtue of which claims are true. In its place I offer an alternative view that merges standard truthmaker theory with a primitivist conception of truth. This combination of views satisfies the theoretical desires that pluralists claim for themselves, but without taking on pluralism's host of challenges and problems.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/227694

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAsay, JF-
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-18T09:12:17Z-
dc.date.available2016-07-18T09:12:17Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2016-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/227694-
dc.description.abstractPluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to pluralism that challenges its fundamental commitment to there being a set of alethic properties in virtue of which claims are true. In its place I offer an alternative view that merges standard truthmaker theory with a primitivist conception of truth. This combination of views satisfies the theoretical desires that pluralists claim for themselves, but without taking on pluralism's host of challenges and problems.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research-
dc.titlePutting Pluralism in its Place-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailAsay, JF: asay@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityAsay, JF=rp01955-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/phpr.12303-
dc.identifier.hkuros259838-

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