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Article: A class of differential games which admits a feedback solution with linear value functions

TitleA class of differential games which admits a feedback solution with linear value functions
Authors
KeywordsGame theory
Differential games
Feedback Nash equilibrium
Dynamic programming
Management
Issue Date1998
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor
Citation
European Journal of Operational Research, 1998, v. 107 n. 3, p. 737-754 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper presents a class of differential games which admits a feedback Nash equilibrium solution with linear value functions. An interesting feature is that not only may the equilibrium strategies be highly nonlinear, they may even assume a general structure instead of an explicit specification. A number of existing games are shown to be games belonging to this class of games. Two new applications — one in political support scrambling and one in common pool non-renewable resources extraction — are provided.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/224792
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.679
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.595

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorYeung, DWK-
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-15T02:51:56Z-
dc.date.available2016-04-15T02:51:56Z-
dc.date.issued1998-
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Journal of Operational Research, 1998, v. 107 n. 3, p. 737-754-
dc.identifier.issn0377-2217-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/224792-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a class of differential games which admits a feedback Nash equilibrium solution with linear value functions. An interesting feature is that not only may the equilibrium strategies be highly nonlinear, they may even assume a general structure instead of an explicit specification. A number of existing games are shown to be games belonging to this class of games. Two new applications — one in political support scrambling and one in common pool non-renewable resources extraction — are provided.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor-
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Operational Research-
dc.rightsPosting accepted manuscript (postprint): © <year>. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/-
dc.subjectGame theory-
dc.subjectDifferential games-
dc.subjectFeedback Nash equilibrium-
dc.subjectDynamic programming-
dc.subjectManagement-
dc.titleA class of differential games which admits a feedback solution with linear value functions-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailYeung, DWK: dwkyeung@econ.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0377-2217(97)00093-3-
dc.identifier.hkuros35845-
dc.identifier.volume107-
dc.identifier.issue3-
dc.identifier.spage737-
dc.identifier.epage754-
dc.publisher.placeAmsterdam, Holland-

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