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Article: The 'Santiago Principles' and the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Evolving Components of the New Bretton Woods II Post-Global Financial Crisis Architecture and Another Example of Ad Hoc Global Administrative Networking and Related 'Soft' Rulemaking?

TitleThe 'Santiago Principles' and the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Evolving Components of the New Bretton Woods II Post-Global Financial Crisis Architecture and Another Example of Ad Hoc Global Administrative Networking and Related 'Soft' Rulemaking?
Authors
KeywordsSantiago Principles
International economic and financial law
New Bretton Woods II
Post-global financial crisis
Sovereign Wealth Funds
SWF
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices
GAPP
Global administrative networks
Issue Date2010
PublisherBoston University * School of Law.
Citation
Review of Banking and Financial Law, 2010, v. 29 n. 2, p. 465-529 How to Cite?
AbstractBeginning in the latter part of 2007, the proposed establishment of Chinese and Russian Sovereign Wealth Funds ('SWFs') sparked considerable governmental, intergovernmental and private financial and business sector interest in, and countervailing concerns as to, SWFs. This concern evolved into a growing realization that the cumulative asset size of SWFs was beginning to represent an increasingly significant (though not yet systemically significant) component of the international capital markets. This significance became further magnified when one considered the separate but related proliferation of other state-owned entities operating and investing globally. In addition, in the latter part of 2007, the U.S. and global financial sectors began to generate heightened investment interest in these SWFs because they helped to shore-up fragile global financial institutions, when the current Global Financial Crisis ('GFC') began to rear its head. Even intergovernmental development institutions came to see SWFs as possible engines for selective economic development financings. Yet, this positive interest in SWFs also precipitated corresponding political ambivalence and outright concerns in various countries over possible untoward geopolitical, national foreign investment and national security implications to which a fundamental shift in global financial and economic markets (i.e., a perceived rise in 'Global State Capitalism') might give rise. This article critiques the ad hoc processes (international, domestic and industry-based) surrounding the establishment of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds ('IWG') of twenty-six IMF member countries having SWFs for the purpose of formulating the SWF-related 'Generally Accepted Principles and Practices' (Santiago Principles or 'GAPP'). The article likewise critiques the subsequent creation in April 2009 of a permanent standing group under the so-called Kuwait Declaration, the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds ('ISWF Forum') for continuing and expanding upon the IWG-ISWF Forum process. The primary objective of this critique is to explore how this IWG-ISWF Forum process (1) can be made more 'administratively sound' in terms of legitimacy, transparency and accountability, and (2) can be made more relevant to the current reconfiguration of the global financial system that is underway under the guidance of the Group of 7 ('G7') Finance Ministers, the Group of 20 ('G20') Finance Ministers and the Heads of State ('Leaders'). In effect, this article addresses the subject matter of SWFs from the vantage point of the proliferation of 'global administrative networks' in the international economic and financial law area.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/224443
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNorton, JJ-
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-05T06:50:25Z-
dc.date.available2016-04-05T06:50:25Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.citationReview of Banking and Financial Law, 2010, v. 29 n. 2, p. 465-529-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/224443-
dc.description.abstractBeginning in the latter part of 2007, the proposed establishment of Chinese and Russian Sovereign Wealth Funds ('SWFs') sparked considerable governmental, intergovernmental and private financial and business sector interest in, and countervailing concerns as to, SWFs. This concern evolved into a growing realization that the cumulative asset size of SWFs was beginning to represent an increasingly significant (though not yet systemically significant) component of the international capital markets. This significance became further magnified when one considered the separate but related proliferation of other state-owned entities operating and investing globally. In addition, in the latter part of 2007, the U.S. and global financial sectors began to generate heightened investment interest in these SWFs because they helped to shore-up fragile global financial institutions, when the current Global Financial Crisis ('GFC') began to rear its head. Even intergovernmental development institutions came to see SWFs as possible engines for selective economic development financings. Yet, this positive interest in SWFs also precipitated corresponding political ambivalence and outright concerns in various countries over possible untoward geopolitical, national foreign investment and national security implications to which a fundamental shift in global financial and economic markets (i.e., a perceived rise in 'Global State Capitalism') might give rise. This article critiques the ad hoc processes (international, domestic and industry-based) surrounding the establishment of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds ('IWG') of twenty-six IMF member countries having SWFs for the purpose of formulating the SWF-related 'Generally Accepted Principles and Practices' (Santiago Principles or 'GAPP'). The article likewise critiques the subsequent creation in April 2009 of a permanent standing group under the so-called Kuwait Declaration, the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds ('ISWF Forum') for continuing and expanding upon the IWG-ISWF Forum process. The primary objective of this critique is to explore how this IWG-ISWF Forum process (1) can be made more 'administratively sound' in terms of legitimacy, transparency and accountability, and (2) can be made more relevant to the current reconfiguration of the global financial system that is underway under the guidance of the Group of 7 ('G7') Finance Ministers, the Group of 20 ('G20') Finance Ministers and the Heads of State ('Leaders'). In effect, this article addresses the subject matter of SWFs from the vantage point of the proliferation of 'global administrative networks' in the international economic and financial law area.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherBoston University * School of Law.-
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Banking and Financial Law-
dc.subjectSantiago Principles-
dc.subjectInternational economic and financial law-
dc.subjectNew Bretton Woods II-
dc.subjectPost-global financial crisis-
dc.subjectSovereign Wealth Funds-
dc.subjectSWF-
dc.subjectGenerally Accepted Principles and Practices-
dc.subjectGAPP-
dc.subjectGlobal administrative networks-
dc.titleThe 'Santiago Principles' and the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Evolving Components of the New Bretton Woods II Post-Global Financial Crisis Architecture and Another Example of Ad Hoc Global Administrative Networking and Related 'Soft' Rulemaking?-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.volume29-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.identifier.ssrn2745618-

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